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Abstract: 
This review identifies over sixty countries that have –  or had –  pre-employment and 
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The objective of the review is to identify lessons of good practice in the design 
and implementation of National Training Funds.  It seeks to answer the question: what is 
effective, or not, under different conditions.  
The review presents a typology of training funds that differentiates three main 
types by purpose: pre-employment training funds, enterprise training funds and equity 
training funds. Given the paucity of evaluations, the review presents mainly anecdotal, 
descriptive evidence on how the various types of training funds are financed and what 
they have done.  
National training funds are an increasingly common vehicle for financing 
training. A ‘training fund’ is a stock or flow of financing outside normal government 
budgetary channels dedicated to developing productive work skills.  The overall purpose 
of training funds is to raise the productivity, competitiveness and incomes of enterprises 
and individuals by providing them with needed skills. Most training funds are financed 
by levies on enterprises, but may also be based on public subsidies or donor financing. 
Generally national training funds serve to (a) unify various sources of financing 
for training, (b) augment the volume of resources for training, and (c) allocate the funds 
in accordance with national policies and priorities.   Training funds may be single 
purpose, but most have multiple objectives. These may include pooling of income from 
various sources, mobilizing resources, building training capacities, expanding the volume 
of enterprise training, providing access to training by disadvantaged populations, 
improving the relevance and quality of training, using resources efficiently and 
developing competitive training markets.  
Payroll training levies are the principal sources of financing for training funds. 
This review has identified over sixty countries that have -- or had -- levy schemes for 
training.  Most schemes are found in Latin America and Africa, but also tend to be 
prevalent in Europe. Training levies are not restricted to larger countries; they operate in ii 
countries with relatively small populations. However, levy success depends on a 
sufficiently wide economic base in the formal sector and reasonable administrative 
capacity. 
Payroll training levies are basically of two types: revenue generating levies and 
incentive schemes.  Incentive schemes, in turn, are made up of three types: cost 
reimbursement, levy grant and levy exemption or rebate. However, distinctions among 
these types of training levies should not be pushed too far.  Few pure models exist; many 
are hybrids. 
Earmarked payroll levies can be viewed as “benefit taxation,” i.e. those that 
benefit (employers and workers) pay for the training. Levies can provide a steady and 
protected source of funding for training, particularly in the context of unstable public 
budgets. However, under fiscal pressure, government may divert levy proceeds into general 
public tax revenues for non-training uses. Payroll levies may constitute an over-sheltered 
source of funding, leading to unspent surpluses, inefficiencies and top-heavy bureaucracies 
Sectoral, or industry-specific, training funds are an alternative to national 
(centralized) funding models.  Sectoral levies are limited to a defined sector of the 
economy, such as industry or transport. A national system of sectoral funds offers the 
advantages of flexibility and the ability to focus more directly on sectoral training needs.  
They may be more palatable to employers because of a sense of greater industry-specific 
orientation, less bureaucracy and greater sense of ownership. However, they do not 
facilitate redistributing funds across sectors or financing non-sector related skill 
priorities.  Sectoral funds may duplicate efforts and fail to develop common core skills, 
transferable across industries.   
Virtually all levy-financed training funds experience difficulties in assisting small 
enterprises. Reasons include inability of small enterprises to diagnose training needs and 
design programs; inability to release staff for training in view of production requirements; 
lack of cash flow. Explicit programs to target small enterprises include vouchers to ease 
cash flow constraints, grants for training needs analysis and course design, use of iii 
intermediaries to organize training services and simplification of administrative 
approvals. 
The principal rationale of pre-employment training funds is to reduce shortages of 
skills workers by increasing the supply of well trained individuals in the labor market. 
The objectives typically are to  create an adequate training supply for the needs of 
employers and create the necessary training capacity to do so. The source of financing is 
a compulsory revenue-generating payroll levy on formal sector enterprises employing at 
least a minimum number of employees (usually 5-20). Enterprises paying the levy do not 
benefit directly in that their workers are usually excluded from the pre-employment 
training. However, enterprises benefit indirectly in being able to recruit better trained 
workers in the labor market. The modus operandi is for the payroll levy to finance the 
establishment and operation of pre-employment training institutions owned and operated 
by the training agency. Pre-employment training funds are found mostly in Latin 
America, but also in Hungary, Mauritius (previously) Tanzania and Fiji. Pre-employment 
training funds have been effective in building national training capacities and increasing 
training provision. For example, SENAI in Brazil trains 2.8 million people p.a. and has 
accounted for over 30 million trainees since its creation. Where governed by employers 
pre-employment training funds can increase the relevance of training to economic 
requirements.  However, care must be taken to avoid conflicts of interest and crowding 
out of other providers, as in Tanzania and Nigeria. 
The rationale of enterprise training funds, or enterprise incentive schemes, is to 
increase the productivity and competitiveness of firms by raising the skills of workers.  
The objective is to increase the incidence of  training within firms.  The source of 
financing is enterprise levies, usually on payroll.  The modus operandi varies according 
to type of scheme: (a) cost reimbursement, (b) levy-grant and (c) levy exemption (train, 
or pay). Beneficiaries tend to be larger enterprises, and within enterprises, those at higher 
occupational levels. Small firms tend not to benefit proportionately. Enterprise incentive 
funds are the most common form of levy scheme world-wide. Rigorous evaluation is 
generally lacking, but in some cases levy schemes have led to an increase in the volume 
of training within enterprises. Levy-grant systems, in particular, can allocate resources iv 
according to national priorities. However, enterprise incentive schemes require 
administrative capacity to operate and can discourage enterprise participation because of 
red tape.   
Equity-oriented training funds aim at raising the incomes of disadvantaged groups 
by providing opportunities to acquire productive skills. They seek to reach people not 
covered by enterprise training schemes, i.e. those outside employment in the formal 
sector who do not have the opportunity for in-service upgrading of skills. The objectives 
of such funds are to train specified target beneficiaries, e.g. unemployed, women, youth, 
those in the informal sector.  They often include subsidiary objectives of stimulating 
competition and training markets, and reducing unit training costs. Equity-oriented 
training funds can be financed through government or levy proceeds, but many are 
financed by international donors. The number and distribution of equity training funds 
could not be determined in this review, but coverage is concentrated in low income 
countries and disadvantaged segments of middle-income countries. The modus operandi 
involves disbursements either through pre-determined funding windows or applications 
by training providers.  Equity-oriented funds have been successful in reaching 
disadvantaged people particularly in the informal sector. Some evaluations have found 
clear impact of training in raising incomes of beneficiaries, but such evaluations are not 
widely practiced. The most basic challenge for equity-oriented training funds is 
sustainability after completion of donor financing. 
The final section poses questions that must be addressed in the design of training 
funds and adduces some examples of good practice.  Key issues common to all types of 
funds are stakeholder participation in governance, allocation of funds, administrative 
autonomy and capacity, use of competition, how to  support small enterprises and 
evaluation of outcomes and impact.  Concerns specific to levy-financed training funds 
include whether they are appropriate to the country context, employer buy-in, avoidance 
of conflicts of interest, degree of cross-subsidization, global vs. sectoral coverage, 
periodic revision of levy rates, collection methods and security of levy proceeds. 
Concerns specific to equity funds include targeting, allocation windows, eligibility of v 
private providers, quality assurance, accounting/auditing, complementary inputs and 
financial sustainability.  
The findings of this review suggest that payroll levies may not be appropriate in 
low income countries where the industrial base is limited and levy-income generating 
capacity is weak.  Such schemes may also not be feasible where administrative or 
organizational capacity is weak for levy collection and administration. Employer-buy-in 
for levy schemes is crucial: extensive consultations and consensus with employers is 
essential on the need and benefits before introducing a levy scheme. Countries that 
allocate a leading role to employers tend to be successful –  e.g.  Brazil,  Singapore.  
Balanced tripartite governance can also be successful – as in Cote d’Ivoire, but over-
control by government (Hungary, Togo) can have deleterious results. Pre-employment 
training funds sometimes crowd out non-fund training providers. There is clearly a need 
to focus more on providing levy-financed training for small enterprises and the informal 
sector. Sustainability of donor-financed training funds looms as a major challenge. 
Which types of training funds work best under what circumstances? More 
evaluation is needed to answer this question.  Pre-employment training funds (supported 
by revenue-generation schemes) should be seen as an initial means to establish national 
training institutions, to be augmented later by more cost-effective systems such as 
employer training incentives.  All three types of enterprise training funds require 
administrative capacity and to an extent impose barriers to access by firms.  Cost-
reimbursement schemes, in particular, can impose a high administrative burden on the 
training fund.  Levy-grant mechanisms have the advantage of directly addressing national 
priorities.  Levy-exemption may have the disadvantage of a “leveling effect,” i.e. firms 
that would otherwise have invested more in training tend to reduce their effort to that 
required by law. Equity training funds may be most appropriate in low income countries 
and for disadvantaged segments in middle-income countries provided financial 
sustainability can be assured.  
The level of rigor in evaluating training funds appears to be relatively low.  Most 
evaluations were simple enumerations of outputs against targets without controls to judge 
the net impact.  Therefore several basic questions remain unanswered, such as whether vi 
one type of fund is more effective in achieving objectives than another type; whether 
incentive-based levies actually stimulate more enterprise-based training than without the 
levy; the extent to which training costs have been lowered and private training markets 
have been stimulated.  More systematic and rigorous evaluation of training funds may be 




The objective of the review is to identify lessons of good practice in the design 
and implementation of National Training Funds.  It seeks to answer the question: what is 
effective, or not, under different conditions. 
The review entails a desk study of National Training Funds worldwide in developed and 
developing countries through an internet search and literature review.  The focus is on 
developing countries, bringing in where possible relevant lessons from developed 
countries.  The review covers activities of training funds in (a) pre-employment 
vocational education and training, (b) in-service training and (c) training for the 
unemployed and disadvantaged groups. 
The review: 
•  Profiles the various types of funds by rationales, objectives, sources of financing, 
modus operandi and coverage/achievements; 
•  Identifies the strengths and limitations of different approaches; 
•  From available evaluation studies of Fund performance and outcomes, documents 
the effectiveness of different approaches in such areas as:   
o  Linking training supply with market demand, involving employers and 
installing demand-side incentives 
o  Stimulating enterprise based training (including for small enterprises) 
o  Stimulating training markets through competition in provision with active 
private participation 
o  Establishing and raising quality standards for training 
o  Reaching disadvantaged and under-served groups; and 
•  Concludes with key questions and lessons of good practice in the design and 
operation of training funds in developing countries. 




The report is presented in six sections:  (I) an overview of training funds; (II) an 
overview of levy-financed training funds, followed by examination of three types of 
training funds: (III) pre-employment training funds; (IV) enterprise training funds; and 




A REVIEW OF NATIONAL TRAINING FUNDS 
Richard Johanson
∗
I.  OVERVIEW OF TRAINING FUNDS
 
1
1.1  Definition and Framework 
 
A ‘training fund’ is a dedicated stock or flow of financing outside normal 
government budgetary channels for the purpose of developing productive skills for work.  
The overall purpose of training funds (TFs) is to raise the productivity, competitiveness 
and incomes of enterprises and individuals by providing them with needed skills. Many 
TFs are financed by levies on enterprises, but may also be based on public contributions 
and donor financing. 
National training funds are an increasingly common vehicle for financing 
training. They are a central instrument for financing training in many countries world-
wide. TFs provide an institutional framework for collecting and allocating funding to 
training providers.  
The functions may differ, but training funds often have the same objectives, 
coverage and modus operandi. Figure 1 shows the overall framework for training funds, 
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1 Based on Ziderman. 2003. “The Development of National Training Funds,” Chapter 5.  
4 
Figure 1.   National Training Funds: Framework of Activities 
 
                         Source:  Ziderman 2003, Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 1 above emphasizes the diversity of sources of financing – including public, private and donor 
sources – and the diversity of beneficiaries of fund expenditures. 
1.2  Objectives and Functions 
A major question to answer is why it is necessary to establish training funds 
separate from an account within government.  Training funds promise several advantages 
compared with financing of training through public ministries.  They can (a) contribute to 
resource mobilization from enterprises and donors; (b) involve employers and foster 
collaboration among stakeholders and social partners; (c) relate training supply better to 
market requirements through active participation by employers; (d) enhance quality 
through accreditation of training providers and insistence on performance conditions; (e) 
induce efficiency in the use of resources through competitive bidding on training 
contracts.  Moreover, they can focus attention on neglected segments, such as small and 
informal enterprises, the unemployed and needs of women. 
Generally national training funds serve to (a) unify various sources of financing 
for training, (b) augment the volume of resources for training, and (c) allocate the funds  
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in accordance with national policies and priorities.   Training funds may be single 
purpose, but most tend to have multiple objectives.  These may include the following: 
1.  Unify and coordinate various sources of revenue, i.e. pooling of income from 
different sources; 
2.  Mobilize resources and increase revenue available for training; 
3.  Build pre-employment training systems and capacities; 
4.  Expand the volume of employer-based training by encouraging enterprises to invest 
more in worker training; 
5.  Provide equality of opportunity for access to training services by disadvantaged 
populations; 
6.  Improve the relevance of training, e.g. allocate funds according to employer priorities  
and market needs;  
7.  Raise the quality of training, e.g. through accreditation of training providers and 
specification of performance conditions; 
8.  Use training resources efficiently, e.g. lower the unit costs of training;  
9.  Develop competitive training markets; and 
10. Foster involvement by employers and collaboration among stakeholders. 
The multiplicity of objectives makes it difficult to generalize about training funds. 
“The characteristics of individual training agencies (funds) vary so greatly that it is 
difficult to generalize about them … The concept of “best practice” in relation to training 
funds is nebulous, given this heterogeneity of objectives and practice.” (Ziderman 2003).  
Multiple objectives also make it extra important to specify objectives clearly and to 
evaluate systematically outputs, outcomes and impact in relation to the stated objectives.  
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1.3  Typology of Training Funds 
Three main types of training funds can be differentiated by purpose: pre-
employment training funds that finance pre-employment training, enterprise training 
funds that finance in-service training of workers, and equity training funds that target 
disadvantaged groups.  
Table 1.  A Typology of Training Funds 
Type  Main Purpose  Financing Sources 
1. Pre-employment Training 
Fund 
Finance the expansion and 
delivery of initial training 
before employment 
Payroll levy- revenue 
generating 
2. Enterprise Training Fund  Provide incentives to 
increase in-service training 
of workers within enterprises 
Payroll levy- incentive 
schemes 
3. Equity Training Fund  Increase opportunities for 
skills acquisition by 
disadvantaged groups not 
covered by enterprise 
schemes 
Public subsidy, levy or 
donors 
Source:  Author. 
1.4  Characteristics of Training Funds 
Training funds originated with earmarked training levies – developed in several 
Latin American countries in the 1940s and 1950s.  A protected depository was developed 
for the proceeds of the levy, which accounts for the growth of special training funds. 
Early training funds (e.g. Brazil) tended to be single purpose – aimed at financing pre-
employment training.  Others focused on expanding the volume of in-service training 
within enterprises.  Typically training funds exhibited a high degree of congruence 
between those who financed the levy and those who received the benefits.  More recently, 
training funds have been increasingly regarded as a general funding pool for a wide 
variety of beneficiaries.  
Most training funds receive their income from training levies, alone or in concert 
with funding from other sources, mainly government budgets.  In other cases, no training 
levies exist and the government and donors remain the principal financiers.   
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Figure 1.1, above, shows the major categories for the destination of funds, 
sometimes called “funding windows.”  A fund may not cover all the purposes.  Each of 
the categories aims at different clients and represents a response to different training 
needs and policy objectives.    
•  Core funding for pre-employment training in training institutions constitutes the 
primary and most traditional use.  This pertains mainly to formal sector 
occupations and employment.  
•  The second use can be for training of workers in enterprises, through 
apprenticeships, on-the-job training or training off the premises.  This constitutes 
the bulk of training provided through training levies.  
•  Third, training funds may offer services to build the skills and productivity of 
people working in microenterprises and the informal sector.  Given the small 
scale of such operators, the way to reach them is often through intermediaries, 
such as informal sector associations. Training for the needs of micro-enterprises 
and the informal sector has generally been neglected in traditional training 
programs.  
•  Fourth, training funds may open a funding window to train the unemployed or 
disadvantaged groups.  Such training traditionally has been regarded as a 
government responsibility, but competitive contracting for such training is 
becoming a preferred mechanism to finance it.   
The effectiveness of a training fund depends to a large extent on the degree of 
autonomy, participation of stakeholders and composition of governing bodies. 
Governance varies considerably across training funds.  Some TFs are part of broader, 
usually autonomous national training authorities, vested with a wide range of powers and 
responsibilities.  Others are more narrowly focused on specific sectors of the economy.   
Most training funds are statutory, quasi-autonomous bodies.  They usually operate under 
the general umbrella of labor ministries and under the direction of a board with varying 
degrees of stakeholder representation. Board representation is typically tripartite 
(government, employers and unions), often divided equally among the three parties.    
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Historically, separate training funds were developed as part of training levy 
systems to protect the levy proceeds from government encroachment.  But the main 
rationale for training funds is not protective.  Rather, it is to evaluate and plan the needs 
of the training system as a whole, minimize political intervention in the allocation of 
funding, and ensure that disbursements coincide with market needs.  The benefits of 
autonomy are unlikely where ministerial control remains strong and where governing 
boards are unrepresentative of stakeholders, and advisory only rather than managerial 
(Ziderman 2003). 
Where payroll levies finance a substantial part of training a case can be made that 
employers should have some control on the uses of the levies. The degree of employer 
involvement varies greatly.  Madagascar (IDA funded) 10 of the 12 members on the 
Board of the National Council for Technical and Vocational Training (CNFTP) were 
employers.  In Cote d’Ivoire (FDFP) and Kenya (NITC) employers made up one third of 
the membership of tri-partite bodies.  In Tanzania (VETA) only 2 of 11 members of the 
management board are employer representatives.  In Brazil –  SENAI the fund is 
controlled by employers without worker representation.  In Singapore the SDF employers 
have a near majority (7 of 15 positions, including both Chair and Vice-Chair) compared 
with three positions for union representatives and four for government. 
However, the substantial representation of employers does not mean necessarily 
that it is representative of the broad constituency of employees.  The employer 
representative may be merely a bureaucratic officer in a large organization with little 
direct enterprise experience or contact. 
Training funds are typically allocated functions that transcend simple 
disbursements.  They must monitor the effects of the expenditures and the training 
system.  They may also provide related services, such as advising enterprises on how to 
develop and improve training capacity.  Some training funds, such as SENAI, are moving 
beyond training to give technological advice to firms. Often training funds are used to 
finance the wider responsibilities of national training authorities, such as developing 
training policies, supervising national skills testing and certification, and providing 
information about training demand and supply. Training authorities often are responsible  
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for accreditation of training providers.  More recently, national training authorities 
throughout the world have become involved in developing national qualification 
frameworks that establish skills standards and promise greater portability of skills. 
Independence from close ministerial control and strong representation of employers on 
NTA management boards can provide for strong enterprise links, flexibility and 
responsiveness and for fostering private training markets (Atchoarena 1996).  
The next section looks at training levies, the main sources of financing for 
training funds. This is then followed by an examination of the three main types of 
training funds. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF LEVY- FINANCED TRAINING FUNDS 
2
The Minister of Labor of South Africa articulated the rationale for levy financing 
of training funds succinctly in 1999: “Internationally, the establishment of training funds, 
sourced from training levies on company payrolls, has been an important instrument for 
catalyzing increased and more effective investments in skills formation by companies. 
Levy schemes provide incentives to encourage individual employers to invest in their 
own training needs, and allow government to leverage more structured training on the 
part of enterprises. They smooth over fluctuations in training caused by the business 
cycle. The more effective schemes locate levy funds under national training authorities, 
giving employers and unions a direct say over the disbursement of these funds, thereby 
improving the accountability and relevance of education and training provision.” 
(Ministry of Labor, address to National Assembly, 1999, Annex 2.1)  
 
                                                 
2 This section is drawn mainly from the following sources: Gaskov 1994; ADB 1997; Ziderman 2003.   
10 
 
2.1  Types 
Within the context of  enterprise training, the following diagram depicts the 
various types of levy-financed training funds:  
Figure 2.  Types of Levy Financing 
 
Source:  Johanson 1996. 
Payroll training levies are basically of two types: revenue generating levies and 
incentive schemes.  Incentive schemes, in turn, are made up of three types: cost 
reimbursement, levy grant and levy exemption or rebate.
3
                                                 
3 Tax credits are not used frequently in developing countries, and are not discussed in this report.  They 
require mature or maturing economies to work successfully (UNEVOC 2006, 4.6).  They have been tried 
unsuccessfully in Mauritius and Brazil.  Chile is the main example of a country using tax credits at present. 
 However, distinctions among 
these types of training levies should not be pushed too far.  Few pure models exist. They 
tend to change over time.  For example, training levies that started as purely revenue-
generating schemes have become mixed with the inclusion of elements of levy grant or 
rebate.  Also, funds tend toward multiple uses, such as France. (UNEVOC 2006, 4.2)  
Jamaica and Mauritius are examples of hybrid funds –  using more than one modus 
operandi.  The Jamaica levy is both revenue-generating for training the unemployed and 
exempts firms from some of the levy to the extent that they training their own workers.  
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(ADB 1997).  The Mauritius scheme is clearly mixed: about half the levy proceeds goes 
to support public training institutions, and about 40% is reimbursed to firms. (Ziderman) 
2.2  Coverage 
A 2003 review of levy systems (Dar et. al.) noted more than thirty countries 
world-wide that had adopted levy financing for training. However, this review has 
identified about sixty countries
4 Table 2  that have – or had – levy schemes for training ( ). 
Table 2.  Approximate Distribution of Training Levies by Region and Type 



















17  16  -  -  1  4 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
17  6  2  9  6  - 
Europe  14  2  1  9  2  2 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
7  2  -  -  4  1 
Asia & Pacific  7  1  2  4  2  - 
Total  62  27  5  22  15  7 
Note:  Column 1 refers to countries.  Columns 2-6 refer to the specific types of schemes. Several 
funds include more than one type of scheme.   
Source:  Summarized from Annex 2.2. 
Most schemes are found in Latin America and Africa, but also tend to be 
prevalent in Europe. Asia, particularly South Asia, has  relatively few training levy 
schemes.  The great potential of levy schemes for expanding the tax base for training 
explains the wide dissemination of training levies (UNEVOC 2006, 2.4). 
                                                 
4 The 2003 review and the present one differ in number of countries with training levies mainly because 
this review includes several advanced countries in Europe, as well as those newly created (Namibia, 
Botswana, Poland).  
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Training levies are not restricted to larger countries.  They operate in countries 
with relatively small populations – Fiji, Marshall Islands, Botswana Mauritius, Barbados, 
Jamaica, Namibia and countries of Central America. However, levy success depends on a 
sufficiently wide economic base in the formal sector and reasonable administrative 
capacity. These schemes are more effective in countries with large formal sector, i.e. a 
large tax base.  They are less effective in countries with highly informal economies. 
Therefore training levies tend to apply almost exclusively in middle and upper income 
countries where these two essential conditions exist, not in low income countries 
(Ziderman 2003; Dar et. al.2003). 
The coverage of levy systems varies widely from country to country.  Most 
schemes exclude the public sector from collections (Mauritius, Tanzania, South Africa.) 
This may result in a cross subsidization of training for public sector employees by the 
private sector to the extent that public employees are trained with levy money.  Size of 
company included also varies.  The Nigerian scheme covers enterprises with 25 or more 
workers, SENATI in Peru with  ≥ 20 workers , ≥ 10 workers in Colombia, and  ≥ five 
workers in Honduras, Venezuela and Costa Rica. The South African levy is assessed on 
firms with annual payrolls over R500,000.  Most of the revenue collected by training 
funds comes from large and medium sized firms.  Given the administrative costs and 
likely yield, collections from small firms may not be cost-effective. (Ziderman). 
Collection methods vary and include: self collection by the training fund (Kenya), 
collection by the social security agency (Namibia), but the most common and effective is 
collection by the tax administration (South Africa).  VETA in Tanzania increased its 
revenue dramatically when it switched collections from the social security agency to the 
tax revenue authority in 2001.  
In several cases payroll levies are appropriated by the central government and 
never reach the training fund. This has happened in Costa Rica, Gabon, Togo and, 
briefly, in Cote d’Ivoire. Box 1, below, illustrates this problem for levies enacted in Togo 
and The Gambia.   
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Box 1. Misallocation of levy proceeds in Togo and The Gambia 
 
 
In other cases payroll levies have led to unspent surpluses, in effect becoming an 
over-sheltered source of funding. This has happened in Zimbabwe where revenues from training 
tax far exceeded the demands of cost reimbursement. This led to questionable forays into fields 
unassociated with objectives of the fund (e.g. purchase of real estate.)  Surpluses in Latin 
America also led to top-heavy bureaucracies and inefficient use of resources, e.g. INCE in 
Venezuela and SENA in Colombia. This highlights a central question:  how can a payroll tax 
system be made flexible enough to respond to changing requirements and avoid surpluses 
without forgoing the benefit of stable funding (Ziderman, 105-106)? 
Several World Bank-financed projects sought to activate or redirect payroll levies.  The Gambia 
project attempted to make an existing levy functional and a project in Togo aimed at redirecting 
an existing one percent vocational training tax to its original purpose.  levy on the wage bill of 
enterprises was collected, amounting to about $500,000 equivalent per year.  The Ministry of 
Finance only allocated it to the Training Fund only for a short time in the initial stages.  
Thereafter, paying the civil service and debt service became higher priorities.  One cause of this 
misappropriation was reportedly poor understanding of VET reforms among top leaders. 
Moreover, The Gambia project helped create a training levy in 1994, but it was not used to 
finance TVET because of other political priorities for the funds. The National Education Levy of 
1995 was amended in 2005 for the collection of 0.25% of the gross annual revenue (turnover) of 
an employer. Collection started in January 2007, but only lasted one month in implementation.  
Enterprises in some sectors, such as banking – with high turnover and low profit margins – were 
required to pay heavy sums.  They resisted and approached the President to present their dilemma, 
claiming that the levy would cause investors to run away.  The President rescinded the law in 
February 2007 and put in its place a modified schedule.  The levy schedule introduced in March 
2007 now calls for companies earning over D5 million to pay a flat fee of D50,000, and 
companies under D5 million will pay D30,000.  There is no lower cutoff.  All firms are supposed 
to pay. This formula is flawed, as smaller firms are not exempt and many complain they cannot 
pay the D30,000 levy as it would take an excessive share their meager profits.  The reduction in 
levy proceeds means that the NTA has no functioning financial wing by which to provide support 
to training providers. These experiences underscore the risk that training levy proceeds may be 
misappropriated by financially-strapped Ministries of Finance. 
Source: Johanson 2002, 2008b.  
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2.3  Strengths and Weaknesses 
The strengths and weaknesses of training levy systems are well documented.  
Table 3 provides a summary of the main points. 
Table 3.  Advantages and Limitations of Levy Systems 
Advantages  Limitations 
Earmarked payroll levies can be viewed as 
“benefit taxation,” i.e. those that benefit 
(employers and workers) pay for the training.   
Earmarked taxation does not conform well with 
the principles of sound public finance and weaken 
attempts to unify the national tax system. 
Levy systems can augment substantially the 
resource base for training.   
Payroll levies raise the cost of labor to the 
employer, possibly discouraging employment. 
Increased training resources, in turn, can 
substantially increase the incidence of training 
Employers may shift the incidence of the levy on 
to workers in the form of lowered wages;  in this 
case, workers and not the employers bear the 
burden of the tax.   
Levies can provide a steady and protected 
source of funding for training, particularly in the 
context of unstable public budgets. 
Insecurity of income: Under fiscal pressure, 
government may divert levy proceeds into general 
public tax revenues for  non-training uses 
Levy-grant systems can encourage firms to 
intensify their training efforts, increase training 
capacity and raise training quality.   
Unequal access: many firms, particularly small 
ones, do not benefit from the scheme; this breeds 
resentment, opposition and compromises  the 
status of training levies as “benefit taxation” 
Training levies collected from formal sector 
employers can serve as a vehicle for cross 
subsidization, e.g. for smaller employers and 
especially for firms in the informal sector. 
Inefficiency: Payroll levies may constitute an 
over-sheltered source of funding, leading to 
unspent surpluses, inefficiencies and top-heavy 
bureaucracies 
Funds with tri-partite management can forge 
cooperation among the social partners and 
facilitate formulation of appropriate training 
policies. 
Red tape may erect high barriers for firms to 
access funds 
Funds can influence the quality of training 
through accreditation procedures and helping to 
stimulate a competitive training market. 
 
Levy-financed funds can also help correct 
imbalances in training access by pooling funds – 
e.g. for training disadvantaged segments of 
society, unemployed, those in the informal 
sector. This redistribution can be termed “cross-
subsidization.” 
 
Establishment of a separate training fund 
account can facilitate transparency and 
minimize distrust between employers and the 
public sector 
 
Sources:  Ziderman 2003, as summarized in Johanson and Adams 2004; CEDEFOP 2008.  
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2.4  Sectoral Levies 
Sectoral, or industry-specific, training funds are an alternative to national 
(centralized) funding models.  Sectoral levies are limited to a defined sector of the 
economy, such as industry or transport. In some countries sectoral training funds have 
been established based on training levies.  This includes Brazil (SENAI in industry; 
SENAC in commerce; SENAR in agriculture; SENAT in transport), Peru (SENATI in 
industry and SENCICO in construction) and in South Africa (23 sectoral training 
authorities- SETAs.)   
As shown in Annex 2.2, a  few countries have multiple sectoral-based funds 
(Brazil [5]; Belgium [11]; Denmark [10-15]; Italy [14]; the Netherlands [89]; South 
Africa [23]; U.K.[25]). Many of these sectoral funds are the result of collective 
bargaining agreements between workers and employers, and some are voluntary.  The 
approach shown in South Africa is particularly unique (Box 2).  
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Box 2. The South Africa Sectoral Levy 
 
A national system of sectoral funds can focus on the training needs of particular 
sectors and in principle engender a greater sense of ownership among the enterprises. 
Sometime sectoral funds can address specific manpower or qualification shortages. A 
national system of sectoral funds offers the advantages of flexibility and the ability to 
focus more directly on the particular, often differing, sectoral training needs.  They may 
be more  palatable to employers because of a sense of greater industry-specific 
orientation, less bureaucracy and greater sense of ownership. However, sectoral funds 
suffer from narrow focus, which runs counter to an integrated, national approach to skills 
development. The argument against these sectoral funds is that they lock up resources in 
the sector when national interest may require reallocation of training funds across sectors, 
i.e. from non-growing sectors with old technology to rapidly growing sectors with new 
technology. They do not facilitate redistributing funds across sectors or financing non-
In 1999 South Africa faced severe shortages of technical and vocational skills in the labor force alongside 
major unemployment.  Previously, 27 industrial boards had collected voluntary contributions to training 
levies, but these boards covered less than 20 percent of the workforce. The government restructured the 
boards into Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and expanded their coverage to virtually all 
of the non-government wage sector of the economy. Each private enterprise must register with one of the 23 
SETAs. The entire system operates under the aegis of the National Skills Authority under the Department of 
Labor.  
In 1999 the government adopted a one percent compulsory payroll levy to be assessed on all non-government 
enterprises with annual payroll above R500,000. Eighty percent of the levy proceeds are allocated through the 
Department of Labor to the SETAs.  The SETAs, in turn, return half (or 40% of the total levy) to firms that 
prepare annual work skills training plans.  SETAs allocate the balance to special training priorities as defined 
by each bi-partite SETA Board (employers and workers). Twenty percent of the total levy goes to the 
National Skills Fund to fund training in scare skills, unemployed, etc. The National Skills Fund is guided by 
five-year National Skills Development Strategies. In this way a compromise is achieved where enterprises 
cross-subsidize training in other areas, and a national skills strategy is followed. The levy system is, thus, a 
hybrid including elements of levy-grant and levy-exception.  The performance of the SETAs has varied 
considerably.  Several had difficulty in spending the funds allocated to them in the early to mid-2000s.  
However, disbursements have improved across the board to nearly 100 percent. 
Source:  Annex 4.1.  
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sector related skill priorities.  Sectoral funds may duplicate efforts and fail to develop 
common core skills, transferable across industries.  A purely sector-by-sector approach is 
also poorly adapted to regional needs (Ziderman 2003; UNEVOC 2006; CEDEFOP 
2008). 
2.5  Addressing the Needs of Small Enterprises 
Virtually all levy-financed training funds experience difficulties in fostering 
participation by small enterprises. Several factors account for this. Lack capacity to 
assess training needs and design appropriate programs. Production suffers when key 
employees are released for training; the time away from work can be costly in foregone 
output. Small enterprises often face constraints in cash flow to pay for training. The 
smaller scale of training required adds to costs. Small firms may be unaware of the 
benefits and availability of training. (Adams 2007, Adams 2008a)  Small companies 
tended to lag behind because of diseconomies of scale, lack of knowledge about how to 
train, lack of financing and low skills demand from use of mature technologies. (Tan, 
n.d.) Both the SDF and HRDF have developed explicit programs to target small 
enterprises. These included vouchers to ease cash flow constraints, grants for training 
needs analysis and course design, and simplification of administrative approvals (Box 3). 
In Chile the National Training Fund (FONCAP) is charged, inter alia, with 
providing training for micro and small enterprises.  It does this through about 20 non-
profit intermediaries (OTICs) that organize and competitively contract training services 
for groups of small enterprises that would not have the capacity to do this by themselves 
(Martinez 2007). 
The three main types of funds – pre-employment, enterprise and equity – are the 
subjects of the next three sections of the report.  
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Box 3.  Programs to Reach Smaller Firms In Singapore (SDF) and Malaysia (HRDF) 
 
Both the SDF and HRDF Funds included special incentives to encourage smaller firms to train. 
Singapore offered a training voucher to companies with less than 50 workers. Working like a 
discount voucher, it allowed firms to pay 30 to 50 percent of training costs upfront while the SDF 
supported the balance. The voucher helped small enterprises ease cash flow problems when investing 
in staff training as well as reducing the amount of administrative procedure. The voucher helped SDF 
reach 65 percent of enterprises with 10 to 49 workers and 14 percent of those with fewer than 10 
workers. In Malaysia, large enterprises having excess training capacities are encouraged to offer 
training places to employees of other enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises 
which do not have the expertise and resources to formulate and run their own training programs. 
Small enterprises sending workers to these programs are eligible for training grants from the HRDF. 
SDF grants were also extended to enterprises to engage external consultants to conduct company-
wide. 
Training Needs Analyses leading to the submission for financing of a Worker Training Plan to the 
SDF. Although available to all firms, this helped smaller firms access the specialized resources 
needed to assess training needs and design appropriate training programs. Malaysia’s HRDF offered 
similar support helping companies select the most suitable programs to plan for the skill 
development of all employees. This support helped employers to formulate annual training plans that 
led to only one application for a training grant rather than one every time they wanted to train. The 
SDF made available a wide range of pre-approved public courses for companies to subscribe to 
under its Approved-In-Principle (AIP) System. This program was effective in attracting small 
companies that had neither the expertise nor the critical mass to conduct such programs on their own. 
Malaysia’s HRDF offered a similar Approved Training Program (ATP). Employers could select any 
ATP course and send employees for training without prior approval of the HRD Council and claim 
for reimbursements, subject to terms and conditions set by the Council for completion of the training 
program. 
Source: Adapted from Yaushi Hirosato, “Skills Development Fund: A Preliminary Assessment of a Financing 
Alternative for Enterprise-Based Training in the Context of APEC,” (processed), as presented in Arvil V. 
Adams  2007   
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III.  PRE-EMPLOYMENT TRAINING FUNDS (financed by revenue-generating 
levies) 
3.1  Overview 
The principal rationale of pre-employment training funds is to increase the supply 
of well trained individuals in the labor market and reduce the gap between supply and 
demand for skills. The objectives typically are to create an adequate training supply for 
the needs of employers and create the necessary training capacity to do so. The source of 
financing is a compulsory revenue-generating payroll levy on formal sector enterprises 
employing at least a minimum number of employees (usually 5-20). Enterprises paying 
the levy do not benefit directly in that their workers are usually excluded from the pre-
employment training. However, they benefit  indirectly in being able to recruit more 
highly training workers.  
The modus operandi is for the payroll levy to finance the establishment and 
operation pre-employment vocational-technical training institutions owned and operated 
by the training agency. Pre-employment training funds are found mostly in Central and 
South America, but also in Hungary, Mauritius (previously) Tanzania and Fiji. Pre-
employment training funds have built training capacity and increased substantially 
training output in several countries. For example, SENAI in Brazil trains 2.8 million 
people p.a. and has accounted for over 30 million trainees since its creation. Where 
governed by employers pre-employment training funds can increase the relevance of 
training to economic requirements.  They have been effective in building national 
training capacities and increasing training provision. However, care must be taken to 
avoid conflicts of interest and crowing out of other providers, as in Tanzania and Nigeria. 
3.2  Pre-employment Training Funds 
Brazil was the progenitor of revenue-based levies in the 1940s through SENAI 
(industry) and SENAC (commerce).  These schemes are funded by payroll taxes, 
managed by employers. The proceeds finance and operate a system of vocational training 
institutes distinct from the school system (Box 4 and Annex 3.1).  
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Box 4.  SENAI Brazil 
 
SENAI’s prestige explains the wide dissemination of the Brazilian experience all 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. However, this propagation did not purely duplicate 
the governing model but adjusted it.  Government ministries figure prominently in the governing 
bodies of similar institutions in other countries (Atchoarena 1996). 
SENAI, the National Industrial Apprenticeship Service, is the oldest autonomous training agency in 
Latin America.  It is financed through a one percent payroll levy assessed on industrial enterprises as 
well as those of fisheries, transportation and communications.  It is privately managed through the 
National Confederation of Industry and is structured with a national department and 27 regional 
departments.  The national office provides overall normative guidance, technical assistance and 
coordination.  The regional councils are the executive arms of SENAI and operate vocational 
training centers as well as provide training services to enterprises.  Workers organizations are not 
represented in SENAI management bodies. 
The SENAI’s training infrastructure including over 500 vocational training centers, more than 200 
mobile training units and several personnel development centers. Many of these institutions are joint 
ventures operated in co-operation with industry. Major training activities combine in-center pre-
employment vocational training, an apprenticeship scheme and continuing vocational education, 
including company-based programs. SENAI trains more than 2.8 million people per year, 
administers  a network of 726 operational units and has enrolled 30 million since its creation in 
1942.  
SENAI’s strengths are its close relationship to employers and  its needs through its governance 
structure, its administrative independence and its reliable income independent of the government 
budget.  These have allowed it to fulfill its major goal of developing a strong national training 
system.  However, with its own captive training institutions, SENAI has tended to monopolize the 
training market, to favor large companies and provide inadequate incentives for shop-floor worker 
training.   
Sources:  Annex 3.1, Leite 2007, Atchoarena 1996, ADB 1997 and SENAI.br.  
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Much of the success of the Brazilian training funds can be explained by the close 
involvement by enterprises.  Box 5 indicates the evolution of training governance and delivery. 
Box 5.  Employer-Owned and Managed Training in Brazil 
 
 
Annex 2.4 describes the Vocational Training Fund of Hungary which started 
exclusively as a revenue-generation levy directed exclusively to finance initial vocational 
training in public training institutions, but now allocates part of the levy to companies for 
continuing training for their own employees.   
Other examples of revenue-generating levies from other regions are Tanzania and 
Mauritius. These two cases illustrate the problem of conflict of interest inherent where 
Experiences in Brazil, one of the earliest countries to adopt levy-financed training authorities, 
underscore the importance of ownership and employer participation. The chronic gulf between 
supply and demand is bridged by giving full control of training to its users. The National Industrial 
Apprenticeship Service (SENAI) was created in the 1940s and operates under the ownership of the 
Federation of Industries. SENAI was followed by four other sector-specific services aimed at, 
respectively, commerce (SENAC), rural areas (SENAR), small enterprises (SEBRAE), and transport 
(SENAT). All the institutions operate under the same basic structure and legal framework. The 
industries tax themselves to fund their training programs. A 1 percent levy on the payroll funds the 
training operations, and the chambers of employers run the institutions with full independence and 
under private sector statutes.  
The five institutions have evolved in separate directions. SENAI maintains a network of 500 training 
institutions and trains 2 million workers a year. SENAR and SEBRAE were first created as 
government bureaucracies, but this led to inefficiencies, lack of responsiveness and flexibility, and 
political spoils. They were recreated more recently with ownership, management, and budgets given 
to the respective employer associations. Because training markets had already been developed in the 
country, both SENAR and SEBRAE opted to buy training in the market rather than to establish their 
own training institutions. SENAT, the most recent offshoot of SENAI, with the same rules and legal 
framework, took an entirely different path for delivery of training. It created an extensive network 
for training via satellite for more than 1,000 firms throughout the country.  
Source:  Claudio de Moura Castro, 2000, “When Employers Control Training Many Things Can Happen,” in 
Johanson and Adams, 2004 
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the funding agency finances its own training institutions directly.  Tanzania’s Vocational 
Education and Training Authority (VETA) is financed through a two percent payroll tax 
on formal sector enterprises with more than ** employees. The tax is problematic for 
several reasons.  First, it was introduced without much consultation with employers and 
they still resist paying.  Second, the revenue finances mainly the operations of VETA 
itself – the administration and the functioning of its training centers.  The more than 700 
private training providers outside the VETA system receive only five percent of the total 
levy revenue.  While a private training market exists, it is not encouraged or developed 
through VETA.  Third, when employers began paying the levy the government withdrew 
completely from financing any of the costs of vocational training.  Subsequent structural 
changes in Mauritius have eliminated the conflict of interest (Box 6). 
Box 6.  Mauritius Vocational Training Fund 
 
The  Training Levy  Grant Scheme has been in operation since 1990.  The Industrial 
Vocational Training Board (IVTB) was initially a provider, a facilitator and a regulator of 
training in Mauritius.  However, experience showed that the three roles of IVTB could give 
rise to conflicts of interest and were inconsistent with the principle of good governance. It 
was decided in 2001 that the IVTB would concentrate on its role as provider of training. In 
2002, the role of regulator was transferred to the Mauritius Qualification Authority (MQA). 
The role of facilitator (design and management of the levy grant scheme) was transferred to 
the Human Resource Development Council (HRDC) in 2004.  
Employers in Mauritius now have to pay an equivalent of one per cent of their salary bill to 
the Human Resource Development Council (HRDC) for training purposes (training levy). 
The Council has been vested with the responsibility of setting up and managing the National 
Training Fund. To encourage employers to provide training to as many staff as possible the 
HRDC offers training grants as incentives. Under the existing provisions employers can 
recover up to 75 per cent of training costs, depending on their tax rate. To qualify for the 
training grant, training programs may either be conducted in-house or in training institutions 
registered with the MQA. 
Source:  African Development Bank/OECD.  2008.  Economic Outlook 2008, 440-441.  
23 
 
Few evaluations have been conducted of pre-employment training funds (Dar et. 
al., 2003). The reviews that have been done focus on enumeration of outputs, such as 
trainees enrolled. For example, over 15,000 people were trained by the Hungary training 
fund in 1995.  Evaluations done on SENAI programs showed that training had gone up 
by 300 percent. The VETA system in Tanzania has not been evaluated for its impact 
apart from a DANIDA tracer study on two institutions it supported in 2003. 
Table 4.  Advantages and Limitations of Pre-Employment Training Funds Financed  
By Revenue-Generating Levy Systems 
Advantages  Limitations 
Constitute a sheltered source of funding for 
national training systems, more stable than 
public financing.   
Develop large bureaucracies in some cases.  
Some agencies under-provide training and 
accumulate unnecessary surpluses and use 
payroll funds for non-training purposes. (e.g. 
Zimbabwe.)  SENA in Colombia built up 
surpluses to expand gradually into agriculture, 
construction and training for self-
employment.  
Increase the volume of financing available for 
training, reducing the burden of training 
funding falling on the state. 
Use funds inefficiently, in some cases 
Compensate for weak public financing of 
training where public sources are severely 
constrained. 
Lack direct incentives for enterprise training. 
Build competent national training capacities, as 
in Brazil and Colombia.   
Do not benefit employers in proportion to the 
paid levies. For example, enterprises with 
high average wages may have highly trained 
workers and pay high levies, but receive little 
training. It may be difficult to sustain 
employer interest. 
Enhance accountability to employers who 
finance them, e.g. in Brazil,  
Tend not to build training markets, as the 
agencies finance their own training 
institutions first and foremost. It is important 
not to crowd out private training providers 
Foster more efficient institutional management 
when employers are in charge. 
Can cause government to reduce or eliminate 
its funding of training (example: Tanzania). 
Source:  Ziderman 2003, UNEVOC 1996, CEDEFOP 2008.  
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IV.  ENTERPRISE TRAINING FUNDS (In-service training of enterprise 
workers) 
4.1  Overview 
The rationale of enterprise training funds is to raise the productivity and 
competitiveness of firms through worker training.  The objective is to increase the 
incidence of training within firms.  The source of financing is enterprise levies, usually 
on payroll.  The modus operandi varies according to type of scheme: (a) cost 
reimbursement, (b) levy-grant and (c) levy exemption (train, or pay). Beneficiaries tend 
to be larger enterprises, and within enterprises, those at higher occupational levels. Small 
firms tend not to benefit. Enterprise incentive funds are the most common form of levy 
scheme world-wide. They require administrative capacity to operate and often discourage 
participation because of red tape.  Although rigorous evaluation is generally lacking, in 
some cases levy schemes have led to an increase in the volume of training within 
enterprises.  
4.2  Rationale and Objectives 
Enterprise training varies considerably across regions and countries (Figure 3. and 
Figure 4). 
Figure 3.  Incidence of Formal Enterprise Training by Region 
 
Note:  MENA= Middle East and North Africa; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and 
the Caribbean; EAP = East Asia and the Pacific. 
Source:  Tan (2006).  
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Figure 4.  Incidence of Formal Enterprise Training by Country 
 
Source: Tan (2006). 
Low investment in worker training is correlated with low firm productivity. A 
1995 World Bank report found that enterprise training in a number of developing 
countries including Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Taiwan, "...is associated 
with higher firm level productivity in all five economies". The report concluded that this 
"should dispel any skepticism [employers have] about the beneficial effects of training on 
productivity."  (Tan and Batra, 1995) A subsequent study, which analyzed data from 
Investment Competitiveness Assessments (ICAs) found the following productivity gains 
from enterprise-based training in developing countries (Figure 5).  
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Despite the importance of training in raising firm productivity, many enterprises 
under-invest in training because of market failure.  Firms may under-invest in training 
their workers because of fear of poaching, or the “free-rider” problem.  Trained workers 
are free to move from job to job, so enterprises can never be sure of recouping their 
investment in training of workers. Non-training competitors may seek advantage by 
“poaching” trained workers from another firms, thereby appropriating the benefits of the 
training at little or no cost. The fear of poaching reduces the incentives of firms to train. 
Figure 5.  Productivity Gain from Enterprise-based Training (%) 
 
Source: Tan and Batra (1995); Batra (2000), Tan, Savchenko and Pei (2003). “In-Service 
Training and Productivity: Results from Investment Climate Surveys”. 
Despite the importance of training in raising firm productivity, many enterprises 
under-invest in training because of market failure.  Firms may under-invest in training 
their workers because of fear of poaching, or the “free-rider” problem.  Trained workers 
are free to move from job to job, so enterprises can never be sure of recouping their 
investment in training of workers. Non-training competitors may seek advantage by 
“poaching” trained workers from another firms, thereby appropriating the benefits of the 
training at little or no cost. The fear of poaching reduces the incentives of firms to train.  
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The market failure explanation is appealing because it gives a plausible reason 
why the market might under-provide training. The view that market failure was 
extensive, and that such market failure led to skill shortages, gave impetus to the growth 
of levy schemes
5
Enterprise incentive schemes focus on company in-service training.  The rationale 
is to raise the productivity of firms by upgrading the skills of workers. The objective of 
enterprise levy schemes is to induce firms to invest in the skills development of their 
workforce, either internally or externally. 
. The objective of these schemes has been to correct the presumed 
market failure in enterprise training.  (Garavan 1995). 
4.3  Types 
The objective is sought through three types of incentive schemes: cost 
reimbursement, levy grant (cost redistribution) and levy exemption (Gasskov 1994; ADB 
1997; Ziderman 2003).  These are explained in sequence below, followed by a 
comparison of strengths and limitations of each. 
4.3.1  Cost-Reimbursement 
Formal sector employers above a minimum number of employees pay a levy into 
a training fund usually based on the payroll.  Approved training expenditures are 
reimbursed in part, within the limits of the levy paid by the enterprise.  In practice, 
reimbursement  is set below the levy paid to cover central administration costs and 
sometimes to allow for central expenditures on other training services.  Nigerian 
Industrial Training Fund (ITF)
6
Malaysia operates a highly successful scheme of training cost-reimbursement 
through its Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF), Box 7. 
 is an example. Firms can qualify for not more than 60 
percent of the levy  paid, and in practice less than 15 percent of firms apply for 
reimbursement for training costs (Ziderman 2003, 93). 
                                                 
5 Other means to increase financial incentives for firms to invest in training include payback clauses if a 
trained worker leaves, apprenticeship contracts with lower-than-normal training wages, tax credits. 
6 In addition to operating the cost-reimbursement scheme, the ITF finances and operates its own training 
centers, provides advisory services to companies on training and in developing training plans.  
28 
Box 7.  Malaysia Levy Reimbursement Scheme 
 
 
Malaysia’s Human Resource Development Fund is an example of a flexible, demand-driven training 
scheme. The Fund was established in 1993 with a matching grant from government. The objectives of 
the HRDF are “to facilitate and encourage employers in the private sector to systematically retrain and 
upgrade the skills of the workforce in line with their business plans and national development.” The 
Act created a HRD Council with representatives from employers and government and a secretariat to 
administer HRDF schemes. A payroll levy of one percent for employers with  ≥ 50 employees (or, 0.5 
percent for small enterprises that wish to participate) is used for partial reimbursement of approved 
training expenses.  Those who have contributed a minimum of six months are then eligible to claim a 
portion of allowable training expenses up to the limit of their levy payments for the year. Depending on 
their training needs, firms can choose flexibly from among several programs: (i) approved training 
courses provided by registered external institutions; (ii) ad hoc in-plant or external training courses on 
an as-needed basis; (iii) annual training programs. Prior approval of the training courses under the 
second and third programs is required from the HRD Council. However, the Council’s overhead costs 
are kept low.  
Administrative burdens on firms are reduced by automatic approval of courses under the first program, 
by using registered training institutions as collection agents of the council, and by giving firms with 
well developed training plans the option of filing under the annual program. Between 1992 and 2006, 
the HRDF reimbursed firms over 70 percent of the RM 2.0 billion collected and approved training for 
5.3 million workers. Critical success factors were: (1) active employer involvement in the governance 
and operating committees; (2) reduced bureaucracy; and (3) dissemination of information about the 
importance of human resource development for raising productivity and competitiveness. In addition, 
the HRDF provides firms with grants for developing training plans, organizes regional courses on 
training needs assessments, and administers a variety of programs targeting small enterprises. 
Sources:  Harold et. al. 1996; de Ferranti et. al. 2003.  
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Box 8.  Singapore Skills Development Fund (SDF) 
 
 
The objectives of the Singapore SDF go beyond training to influence company choice of technology. This 
formed part of a broader government industrial strategy to restructure the economy towards a more capital-
intensive production system. What makes the Singaporean system unique is that the levy is imposed only 
on the lower-wage workers. The Skills Development Levy is imposed on employers with workers earning 
S$2,000 or less a month. The current levy rate is 1 percent of the monthly remuneration, or S$2, whichever 
is greater. In 2007 the SDF received S$108 million from the levy and in 2008 S$121 million.  
One distinguishing characteristic of the SDF is the strong role of employers.  Seven of fifteen members of 
the Singapore Workforce Development Authority – the agency that controls the SDF --represent employers 
(including the Chairman and Vice-Chairman), compared with four for government and three for workers .   
Incentives for training are offered on the basis of a cost-sharing principle and the training must be relevant 
to the economic development of Singapore. The amount of incentives that a company can obtain is not tied 
to the levy contribution. The Skills Development Fund (SDF) provides financial incentives for training 
those in the workforce, those preparing to join the workforce, and those re-entering the workforce.  
In its effort to support company training, the Fund provides grants on the basis of approved training plans 
through the Total Company Training Plan Scheme. It also promotes special training programs focusing on 
the upgrading of workers’ skills. This includes the Training Assistance Scheme which aims at all types of 
skill upgrading.  In addition, the SDF finances training vouchers and assistance for IT training for SMEs. 
It promotes a systematic approach to skills certification through the Skills Certification Plan for training at 
least a third of a company’s workforce in certifiable skills over a three-year period.  In addition, the SDF 
supports a training leave scheme for older workers and on-the-job training consultancy  services for 
accelerating skills development in the Knowledge Economy.  
The increase in company-based training programs has been significant. The number of people trained and 
number of firms benefiting have multiplied since 1991. Still, the Fund experienced difficulties in 
transforming employers’ attitudes towards training. Small enterprises and low skilled workers still 
constitute largely unreached targets. In the mid-1980s only 2.2% of firms with 10 employees or less applied 
for grants, compared with all firms with 200+ employees and 25 percent of firms with 50 employees.  
Participation by small firms increased to 14 percent by the end of the 1990s. (See Box 2.8 for details.) 
Sources:  ILO < http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/hrdr/init/sin_2.htm >; Atchoarena 1996; 
UNEVOC 4.6; Dar et. al.; SWDA Annual Report 2007/08.  
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4.3.2  Levy-grant (Cost-redistribution) 
Levy-grant seeks to redistribute the burden of training expenditures among 
enterprises. This is designed to counter the ill-effects of poaching on training supply.  The 
modus operandi involves the collection and administration of the levy by a  special 
training fund. National or sectoral funds or boards are created, usually tri-partite in 
nature.  These funds collect levies and decide on the distribution of training grants among 
enterprises. Grants are offered to enterprises on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 
agreed criteria. The grants need not reflect an enterprise’s payments; training companies 
can receive grants far in excess of the amount paid, thus providing incentives for firms to 
train. Funds can be targeted on a variety of benefits, including on the implementation of 
national or sectoral training policies. Cost-redistribution schemes allow a much greater 
distribution of funds towards enterprises that train than revenue raising levies.  The 
drawback of the mechanism is the cost of administration in terms of case-by-case 
decision-making.  Many training funds have elements of cost-redistribution, 
e.g.Mauritius.  Box 8 shows the parameters of the Singapore Skills Development Fund 
(SDF). 
4.3.3   Levy-Exemption (Train or Pay) 
Under this variant, firms are exempted from paying the training levy to the extent 
that they provide approved training to their workers. The government fixes the 
percentage of a payroll either to be spent on training or transferred to the fund.  The 
employers manage their compulsory training allocation within agreed regulations. 
Companies report their training expenditures.  Any balance is transferred to the 
government budget or a central training fund.  This can also be called “train, or pay” 
schemes. Examples:  France, Quebec. 
Korea introduced a type of levy-exemption scheme in the mid-1970s.  In plant 
training was made compulsory for firms with ≥500 employees in 1974.  This was reduced 
to 300 employees in 1976 and 150 in 1991. The government defined strictly the kinds of 
training recognized for this purpose.  Employers were given the option to waive this 
training and instead pay a training levy to a government-administered Vocational 
Training Promotion Fund.  The scheme stimulated an increase in the number of trainees  
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from 13,000 in 1974 to over 96,000 by 1976.  However, the number of trainees fell 
sharply to 15,000 by 1989. Firms claimed it was easier and less expensive to pay the levy 
than meet the training targets.  The levy was repealed as ineffective in sustaining 
increased in-plant training.  Part of the reason for failure can be attributed to complicated 
rules governing training requirements and criteria for approval. (Dar, et. al., 2003) In 
Cote d’Ivoire the Fonds de Developpement de la Formation Professionnelle (FDFP) is an 
example of a successful levy-exemption scheme (Box 9). 
Box 9.  Cote d’Ivoire – Vocational Training Development Fund (FDFP) 
 
Few in-depth evaluations have been made of training incentive schemes. Dar, et. 
al. 2003 presents evidence on the effectiveness of incentive based levy schemes that show 
Cote d’Ivoire has had long experience with implementation of two training taxes: one for continuing training 
and one for apprenticeship training.  An apprenticeship tax was introduced as early as 1959. The core of the 
system is the vocational training development fund (Fonds de développement de la formation professionnelle 
– FDFP). FDFP manages the apprenticeship tax (0.4 per cent of the total wage bill) and the additional tax for 
continuous vocational training (1.2 per cent), levied through compulsory contributions.  
Firms can qualify for a tax exemption of half the continuing vocational tax obligation (0.6 percent) on 
approval by the Fund of a company training plan including internal and external training of employees. In 
addition, firms have an additional incentive of retaining up to an additional half of the tax (0.9 vs 0.6 percent) 
by implementing approved training plans for three years and justifying training expenditures beyond 1.6 
percent of payroll. This arrangement certainly meets the demand of one section of the employers, it limits the 
possibilities of redistribution among enterprises to the detriment of the smaller ones.  
Since 1991 reforms provide for the separation of the financing of training from implementation by public or 
private providers. A major change in the system concerns the financial circuit and the role of the Treasury. 
The collection is still performed by the income tax department, but the revenue is now directly allocated to an 
account at the disposal of the FDFP.  
The FDFP resources are intended to finance the training programs of enterprises, as well as collective forms of 
training for micro-enterprises and non-subscribers through a mutualization system. From 1993 to 2006 the 
FDFP carried out 24,600 training programs that involved 483,000 employees for the amount of nearly €125 
million. In the course of this period 188,000 people were able to benefit from collective training offers at a 
cost of € 51 million. 
Sources:AfDB/OECD, African Economic Outlook 2008, Box 42 and p.267; Atchoarena 1996; Ziderman 2003.  
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some impact on increasing training within enterprises:  The Malaysia HRDF participants 
were more likely to have training their employees compared to non-participants (Tan and 
Gill 1998).  The amount of training undertaken by employers increased in Singapore 
(Tzannatos and Jones 1997).  Similarly, the levy-exemption scheme in France is fully 
used by employers and has increased worker training (Kuruvilla 1999).  In contrast, the 
levy exemption scheme in Korea decreased the number of trainees in the mid 1970s 
owing to complicated rules governing requirements and approval criteria (Gill and Ihm 
1998). 
4.4  Advantages and Limitations 
Each of the three types of levy schemes has advantages and limitations, 
summarized in the table below.  











•  Supports industry training initiatives 
•  Leads to improvement of company 
training in some countries, e.g. development 
of training policies, requirement of company 
training plans, and central advisory guidance 
on training 
 
•  Imposes high administrative and 
maintenance costs which reduce the amounts 
that can be returned to employers 
•  Tends to favor routine training instead of 
new programs 
•  Deters many enterprises from applying 
because of bureaucratic requirements and 
paperwork  
•  Delays training within enterprises in some 
cases because of a slow approval process  
Levy-
grant  
•  Promotes the allocation of resources to 
priority training programs  
•  Supports industry-wide training initiatives 
•  Changes priorities flexibly in accordance 
with changed circumstances  
•  Imposes high administrative costs 
•  Requires effective management skills and 
capacities 




•  Keeps financial allocations within 
enterprises; employers are free to plan, 
manage their funds and administer their 
training. 
•  Economizes on costs --Central 
administration of funds is not required; the 
national cost of administration is low. 
•  Forges links between employers, schools 
and agencies, and stimulates the development 
of private training markets through the option 
for training institutions to compete for 
employer grants (French apprenticeship tax).  
•  Ineffective spending of the compulsory 
allocation in some cases  
•  Cannot support broader sectoral (or 
national) training priorities and activities. 
Sources:  Adapted from ADB 1997 and Ziderman 2003.  
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4.5  Tax Credits 
Tax credits can be used as an alternative to payroll levies.  Chile is probably the 
best example in the developing world.  Enterprises can claim a tax credit of up to one 
percent of the gross wages for expenditures in training workers.  The justification for this 
state subsidy is externalities, benefits that the firm does not receive.  In 2002, more than 
110,000 enterprises trained 846,900 workers, or 16 per cent of the employed labor force.  
The total investment by enterprises in training amounted to about US $ 170 million, of 
which about 85 per cent was funded out of the tax allowance. (Martinez, 20??)  Other 
countries have abandoned tax credits as a means to stimulate  enterprise training, 
including Brazil which terminated tax credits without evaluation (Gaskov 1994). 
The next chapter discusses an alternative to enterprise training funds – equity oriented 
funds. 
V.   EQUITY TRAINING FUNDS 
5.1  Overview 
Equity-oriented training funds aim at increasing opportunities for low-income and 
disadvantaged groups to raise their income by acquiring productive skills. They are 
intended to reach people who cannot benefit normally from levy-financed schemes, i.e. 
those outside employment in the formal sector who do not have the opportunity for in-
service upgrading of skills. The objectives of such funds are to train specified target 
beneficiaries, e.g. unemployed, women, youth, informal sector.  They often include 
subsidiary objectives of stimulating competition and training markets, and reducing unit 
training costs. The number and distribution of equity training funds could not be 
determined in this review, but coverage is likely concentrated in low income countries 
and disadvantaged segments of middle-income countries. Equity-oriented training funds 
can be financed through levy proceeds or government budgets, but for the most part are 
financed by international donors in low income countries. The modus operandi involves 
disbursements either through pre-determined funding windows or applications by training 
providers.  Some evaluations have been done of outcomes and impact, but this is not 
generally the rule.   
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Countries that lack a large formal sector with generally lower levels of income 
and administrative capacity may not be good candidates for payroll-financed training 
levies and their associated training funds.  Moreover, formal sector enterprises may resist 
the diversion of the levies that they pay for training people in the informal sector, even 
though it encompasses the great majority of workers.  As an alternative, governments and 
donors have set up and financed equity-oriented training funds in several countries.  
These funds focus on training for the informal sector and for disadvantaged groups, e.g. 
the unemployed and youth.   
5.2  Government and Levy-financed Equity Funds 
Equity-oriented training funds can be financed by governments and through 
payroll levies.  Good examples are the National Training Fund (FONCAP) of Chile (Box 
10) and the National Skills Fund (NSF) of South Africa (Box 10). 
Box 10.  FONCAP- Chile (Fondo Nacional de Capacitacion) – The National Training Fund 
 
FONCAP, established in 1997, funds public training programs managed by the National Training and 
Employment Service (SENCE).  It receives annual budgetary allocations for this purpose from the 
government. FONCAP targets low income workers not covered by enterprise programs, such as young 
workers entering the labor market without qualifications, unemployed or under-employed adults.  These 
programs are implemented through tenders and bidding by registered training providers, of which there 
over one thousand. 
In 2002 FONCAP financed a total of about 45,000 participants in the following twelve training programs 
(with number of participants noted in parentheses): apprenticeship subsidies for youth (1, 530); training 
subsidies for micro and small enterprises (3360); trade training for low income youth (1350); short 
courses for those without qualifications (10,000); micro-enterprise management for women (100); 
training for those in military and security services (4,280); Chile Barrio- trained 10,650 people in low 
income settlements; individual training scholarships (2,520); youth job retraining (920); “Programa Chile 
Califica”- co-financed by the World Bank – to articulate continuous training with formal education.   
In particular, training for small enterprises is encouraged through about 20 non-profit intermediaries 
(OTICs) that organize and contract training for groups of small enterprises. 
Source: Summarized from Martinez 2007.  
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Box 11. The National Skills Fund (NSF) of South Africa 
 
5.3  Donor-financed Equity Training Funds 
Most equity-oriented training funds tend to be financed by donors.  The sections 
below reviews information about the functioning of training funds supported by three 
different sets of donors:  (1) a 2002 review by the World Bank of training funds in Sub-
Saharan Africa, (2) a 2006 review for France Cooperation of three donor-financed West-
Twenty percent of the training payroll levy on formal sector enterprises is sent directly to the 
NSF and eighty percent goes to sectoral training authorities (Box 2.7)  The purpose of the 
National Skills Fund  is to finance projects arising out of the National Skills Development 
Strategy.  The NSDS calls for 85 percent of the training programs to benefit blacks, 54 percent 
women and four percent the disabled.  The NSF has ten funding windows, but three fourths of 
the funds are allocated to two programs – social development initiatives and critical skills. Just 
under half of the expenditures by the NSF is directed at social development initiatives, including 
training the unemployed and adult basic education and training for the disadvantaged.  About 
one fourth of expenditures go for training in critical skills for youth.  The NSF has well 
developed procedures ensure that competent proposals are endorsed and funded. The NSF has 
been substantial progress towards its quantitative targets: Between 2006-2008 it achieved 72 
percent of its 2010 target of 450,000 unemployed trained, 60 percent of its 2010 target of 
100,000 persons completing adult basic education, and 116 percent of its 2010 target of 125,000 
provided initial work-based training.  However, NSF is faced with several basic constraints and 
issues:   
The NSF is able to spend only half the levy resources it receives.  Factors responsible include 
lack of contractor capacity, lack of staff resources in NSF.  The NSF does not evaluate its results 
adequately.  It is surprising that a fund that is expected to spend R900 million in 2008/09 have 
never been the subject of a major evaluation. (The only monitoring is against NSDS targets.) It 
is not clear at present whether NSF is providing value  for money, i.e. whether the skills 
development it finances is effective at the prevailing costs.  Still, its provision of training 
opportunities to disadvantaged groups is impressive. 
Source:  Department of Labor, South Africa: NSF Annual Report 2008, NSDS2 Implementation Report, 
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African training funds, and (3) examples of two training funds supported by the Asian 
Development Bank. 
5.3.1  World Bank-financed Training Funds in Sub-Saharan Africa – A 2002 Review
7
In 1993 the World Bank recommended consideration for establishment of training 
funds as a source of targeted financial assistance to employers and training institutions 
“to increase flexibility in responding to periodic training needs…”
 
8  Nine World Bank-
financed projects during the 1990s created or supported training funds of various types to 
finance training provision in high priority areas.
9
Experiences were generally positive with these training funds in reaching stated 
objectives and outputs.  The Madagascar project successfully provided training both to 
the formal and informal sectors.  The Cote d’Ivoire project helped unify two levies under 
the FDFP.  Two main institutional factors accounted for the success of the FDFP, 
namely: (1) its autonomous structure, and (2) the direct transfer of the payroll taxes from 
the Treasury to the training agency.  The FDFP even cross-subsidized training for the 
informal sector, i.e. allocated funds raised from levies on the formal private sector firms 
to finance informal sector training.  This was highly unusual at the time. The cross 
 The purported advantage of these funds 
was an ability to finance specific, targeted training based on surveys of needs or 
proposals by beneficiaries.  The funds typically also sought to engender  competition 
among training providers by making all institutions, public, private and NGO, that met 
minimum standards eligible to receive funds.  The underlying aim was to change 
incentives for existing training institutions and stimulate a supply response to market 
forces.  In addition to augmenting resources for training, funds can also make it possible 
to involve employers in control of funds to which they have contributed. 
                                                 
7 Source:  Johanson, Richard K. 2002.  “Sub-Sahara África (SSA):  Regional Response to Bank TVET 
Policy in the 1990s.”  Part I: Main Report, AFTH4,  the World Bank. 
8 Middleton, John and Adrian Ziderman and Arvil V. Adams.  1993. Skills for Productivity: Vocational 
Education and Training in Developing Countries. World Bank and Oxford University Press, 69. 
9 The World Bank-financed projects covered were: Benin (FODEFCA), Cape Verde Basic Education and 
Training (Training Support Fund), Comoros (Vocational Training Fund) Cote d’Ivoire Labor Force Training 
Support Project (FDFP),  Mali (Vocational Training Support Fund), Mauritius, Mauritania (Institutional 
Support Fund and the Training Support Fund), Madagascar (DNFTP), Togo (National Training Fund).    
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subsidization by FDFP amounted to about 18-20% of the allocations for training (and 
were not World Bank financed).   
The training fund in Mauritius also appeared to be successful in achieving its 
objectives and targets, benefiting from a growing economy.  The economy was so 
buoyant that reserves accumulated in the fund. The levy percentage was eventually 
reduced. The performance of the Fund reportedly could have been improved if the 
appraisal criteria for sub-projects have been more well developed.  The smaller training 
funds in the Cape Verde projects also appeared to be functioning successfully.   
The Training Support Fund in Mauritania was successful in financing training 
activities initiated by micro-enterprises.
10
Several observations can be made about these Bank-financed equity-oriented training 
funds.   
 More than 130 proposals, generated by groups 
of workers and cooperatives, were financed.  The results reportedly enabled the 
beneficiary micro-enterprises to become more productive.  The demand-driven nature of 
initiatives supported by the TSF, facilitated by participation of microenterprises in the 
design of the program, reportedly was easily implemented and had substantial impact.  
Still, the TSF was able to use only three fourths of available funds because of initial lack 
of clarity in procedures for accessing the financing. 
1.  Financial sustainability depends not only on a steady and secure source of financing, 
but also how the funds are received (directly from the Treasury seems the best 
alternative, as in Cote d’Ivoire, but is frequently challenged.)  An endowment may be 
another way to ensure steady and secure funding.  
2.  Management and financial autonomy seem to be essential requirements for 
effectiveness.  Both of these characteristics apply to FDFP in Cote d’Ivoire.  In 
                                                 
10 The Mauritania project also included another fund that was not successful.  The Institutional Support 
Fund was intended to finance the development and delivery of training courses by TVET institutions in 
response to employer requests, in effect extending the range of services provided by the institutions.  At 
project completion only a dozen projects had been financed and only one fourth of available funds was 
disbursed.  Factors responsible include (a) delays in legally enabling the institutions to use the funds, (b) a 
restrictive operational manual and a complicated evaluation process, and (c) insufficient public awareness 
of the fund’s existence.    
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Madagascar, the structure of the CNFTP as a semi-autonomous body contributed 
greatly to its ultimate effectiveness.   
3.  Balance seems to be important in the governance structure of a Fund.  Governance in 
FDFP was balanced between government, employers and workers.  This mix was 
highly effective.  It prevented one party from dominating and distorting the 
operations of the Fund.  The opposite was true in the Togo project, where the 
Minister of VET had too powerful an influence in Fund operations.  
4.  Linking training funds with training councils seems to be a good marriage.  The 
presence of funds can make an advisory council more effective, and the  overall 
council can help target the use of funds better.  This combination worked well 
particularly in Madagascar.   
5.  Clear, straightforward (i.e. not overly complex) procedures for approval of fund 
allocations are essential, as shown in the Madagascar and Mauritania cases. 
6.  The funds were successful in providing training for those in the informal sector, but 
the impact of the training was not rigorously evaluated (except for the tracer study in 
Cote d’Ivoire). 
7.  Competition for funds can help stimulate a training market in some cases and help 
reduce unit costs of training.  
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      Box 12. Cote d’Ivoire Case- The Vocational Training Development Fund (FDFP) 
 
The Project financed an extension of the activities of an existing Vocational Training Development Fund (FDFP) 
into new fields, namely: training for small firms and the informal sector.  The Fund financed subprojects submitted 
by sponsors (individuals, firms or organizations) for defined beneficiaries, e.g., female entrepreneurs, micro-
enterprises and small formal sector enterprises. Training advisers of the Fund worked with sponsors to design or 
refine the training program. Training was provided through pre-approved public or private training institutions on 
the basis of competitive bids. 
The main problems experienced in implementation were (1) a slow start in gearing up for training activities because 
of the time required to inform potential beneficiaries and training providers throughout the country, (2) inability for 
the Fund to assure quality simultaneously with building training volume, (3) inappropriate approval procedures for 
small subprojects in the Fund. 
The main achievements were:  (1) training that responded to the needs of the target population.  Some 700 training 
projects were financed benefiting 71,000 people, of whom half were women; (2) geographical dispersion of training 
–85% of the training took place outside Abidjan; (3) reductions in training costs can be attributed to competition 
and standardization of training modules; (3) private providers won three fourths of the training contracts through 
competition; (4) the Fund now practices competition in most of its financing, something new; (5) an increased 
appreciation for the needs of the informal sector by members of the Fund board. In fact, the Fund has started to 
cross-subsidize informal sector training by 18-20% of its budget drawn from a training levy on enterprises in the 
formal sector. 
Some lessons were:  Program effectiveness and sustainability depend on two main factors:  (a) quality of the 
Training Fund organization, leadership and staff – these were strong in this case; and (b) financial autonomy of the 
executing agency –  also strong in this case. It is critical to have adequate autonomy in two dimensions:   
management and finance.  Both were present in the Ivory Coast project.  The tax department collected the payroll 
taxes and paid them directly into the treasury from which the Fund would automatically get its resources.   
Moreover, the equally divided control in the Board among employers, unions and government prevented the 
government from dominating (and distorting) the operations of the Fund.   
Other findings include: reaching the poorest populations requires adequate efforts at outreach, including appropriate 
dissemination of information, field presence, and NGO involvement.  It is also important to invest in supervision 
close to the field.  Assistance was typically needed to convert a training request for informal sector training into an 
acceptable training sub-project  –  designing the training objectives and specifications, addressing beneficiaries’ 
needs. The design of quality assurance for training outcomes may include establishment of clear standards for 
outputs and simple competency-based testing.  Non-training factors are important for good outcomes, not only 
training. Lack of other complementary inputs (water, credit, equipment, markets) tended to limit the impact on 
beneficiaries.  This suggests the need to link subprojects better with microfinance and marketing.  Competition led 
to some dramatic changes in management attitudes in public training institutions.  They became much more 
entrepreneurial, able to diversify funding sources and better attuned to skills needed in the labor market. 
Source:  Annex 5.1  
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5.3.2  French Cooperation – A Review of Three West African Countries 
Governments in three West African countries collaborated with international 
financial institutions to develop three training funds in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
These include the Support Fund for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA) of 
Burkina Faso (starting in 2003), the Promotion of Employment and Vocational Training 
Fund, the FAFPA of Mali (1997), and the Fund for the Development of Vocational 
Training and Apprenticeship (FODEFCA) of Benin (1999). The Malian and Benin Funds 
received support from IDA and French Cooperation from 1996-2001 and 2000-2004, 
respectively.  The Burkinabe fund was supported by technical assistance from Austria, 
Switzerland, GTZ and French Cooperation. 
Existing technical education was considered to be too academic in these countries 
and disconnected from economic realities. The creation of the funds sought a double 
break from this traditional pattern: (i) moving from a supply-based approach dominated 
by technical education to a demand-based approach driven by employers’ needs, and (ii) 
promoting a vocational training market through the implementation of transparent 
procedures for invitations to tender.   
The three funds had the following characteristics in common: i) they were funded 
indirectly by payroll levies through the government budget, i.e. formal enterprises paid 
the levies to government and the ministries of finance were expected to finance the funds 
through the government budget, ii) training was provided for both the formal and 
informal sectors. (iii) the funds supported dual-type apprenticeship actions (“alternance”, 
or, part of the training given within training centers and part on-the-job training).  
The main findings and outcomes were as follows: 
1.  The funds played an important role in pooling funds from various sources. 
2.  The funds were successful in articulating the skill requirements of employers. 
3.  The funds financed considerable training for target beneficiaries especially in the 
informal sector.  About 21,000 persons were given informal sector training in Mali 
over the project period, and 5200 in modern sector occupations.  In Benin, 11,000 
were trained in agricultural occupations, almost 7,000 in non-agricultural informal  
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sector occupations, 2,900 in modern sector jobs and 1,500 dual apprentices. However, 
targets for female beneficiaries were only about half achieved.  
4.  The tripartite nature of governance varied considerably. In general, the public sector 
dominated. Governance was weakened by the lack of real employers in Mali and lack 
of unions in Burkina Faso. 
5.  Application of rigid procedures made it impossible to use available funds fully. This 
underscores the need to simplify administrative and financial procedures, especially 
for micro and small businesses. 
6.  Ministries of finance transferred only a small part of the levy revenue it received from 
enterprises to the Funds, confiscating the balance for other government expenditures.  
7.  Formal sector employers supported payment of the levies for informal sector training. 
8.  Changing to a demand-oriented system required a movement away from a “catalog” 
of training courses to tailor making courses for employers and workers. In practice 
this was limited by lack of available expertise in adapting training content and the low 
demand for training on the part of artisans. 
9.  Demand for training turned out to be too weak to stimulate a training market. The 
availability of financing attracted mainly the training providers that did not need 
specific equipment or permanent instructors; e.g. trainers in management and 
computing. The failure of invitations to tender demonstrated an inability to stimulate 
a consistent supply response. This failure was not only the result of complex 
procedures.  There was no predictable, sufficiently large demand for training to 
justify investment and risk-taking by potential training providers. A training market 
cannot be decreed by imposing procedures, albeit simplified ones. A training market 
will only develop as effective training demand grows (Walther and Gauron 2006, 
Annex 5.2).  
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5.3.3  Asian Development Bank-financed Projects in Asia 
The Asian Development Bank has financed several projects that included training 
funds, and several new ones have just started (Maldives, Bangladesh.)  Two of them --
Papua New Guinea and Cambodia-- are explained below. 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
The project in PNG was based on extensive analysis of training requirements in 
the informal sector for self-employment and income generation.  It also included 
extensive analysis of public and non-government training provision, including a 
categorization and evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of different types of 
providers. It concluded that the potential existed on which to build a training market.  It 
also focused on ways to overcome the commonly-known limits to sustainability of a 
training fund.  Considerable thought was given to making the training fund sustainable by 
mobilizing additional resources from government and non-government sources, and by 
establishing a trust fund for continuous financing of priority training. See Box 13 below.  
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Box 13. Training Fund for Sustainable Skills Development in Papua New Guinea 
 
The ADB-funded Employment-Oriented Skills Development Project in Papua New Guinea (PNG, 
1999) established a donor-government training fund (The Skills Development Trust Fund) to provide a 
permanent source of financial support to informal sector training. The Fund was registered as a juridical 
person to ensure legal and political independence.  The training providers were selected on a 
competitive basis and included public vocational centers, churches, nongovernment organizations, and 
private training providers. Training needs analysis was included in proposal preparation, as well as 
post-training support and guidance. Performance conditions were also established.  Satisfactory results 
were a precondition for subsequent training contracts: winning training providers were required to 
provide evidence of post-training employment. 
The Fund’s capital (about K50 million including loan proceeds of about US$15 million equivalent) was 
invested and managed by an experienced professional.  The accrued interest from the invested capital 
was used to co-finance short-term employment-oriented skills training. As long as the annual interest 
generated by the fund was equal to, or greater than, the annual expenditure on skills training, 
sustainability could be assured. 
The Fund  was slow in starting because of requirements for special legislative and bureaucratic 
measures, and the need for individual provinces to contribute first to the fund’s capital before 
qualifying for its resources. The first disbursements took nearly three years after the project began. The 
Skills Development Trust Fund  awarded 420 training contracts with 8,210 participants comprising 
2,620 male youth and 5,590 females. Contracts were awarded after reviewing: (i) the quality of training 
proposals, including the program delivery capacity of trainers; (ii) the viability of funding under the 
project accounts; and (iii) the distribution of skills-training courses. By the end of 2007, the Fund had 
benefited more than 10,000 people, 40% of them women. About 75% of participants found self- or 
wage employment within 1 year of completing their training programs. 
Additional benefits: (1) The Fund became a catalyst for mobilizing additional resources for informal 
sector training. It increased the financial commitment to skills training in the provincial level through 
the required provincial contributions. Moreover, as the fund covered only a part of the total training 
costs, both providers and participants contributed to the cost of programs, resulting in a degree of 
broad-based ownership not normally associated with project-financed skills training activities. (2) The 
Fund also stimulated development of local training markets where it operated through competitive 
bidding for training contracts open to all qualified training providers, public, NGO and private. By the 
end of the project about one hundred different training providers had accessed fund resources. 
Sources: Annex 5.3, ADB 2004, ADB, 2008 Skilling the Pacific, ADB 2008 Project Completion Report.  
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Cambodia -- National Training Fund (NTF) (Annex 5.4)  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported the establishment of a National 
Training Fund under its Basic Skills Project  (completed in 2003.)
11
The NTF included two financing facilities
  The National 
Training Fund (NTF) was envisaged as mechanism to finance training from both 
Government and non-Government funds over the medium and long-term. The NTF 
served as a means for providing Project-financed support for demand-oriented training, 
such as training programs relevant to employment needs and in accordance with the 
training policy and strategy of the National Training Board (NTB). In the longer term, the 
NTF was expected to evolve into the main mechanism for funding of employment-related 
training, including enterprise-based training. It aimed at becoming an instrument for 
providing incentives to training institutions, enterprises, and the private sector to upgrade 
and extend their provision of training. 
12
The Training Grant Fund trained a total of 13,100 beneficiaries from 24 
provinces/cities in 53 skill areas at a cost of $1.9 million, or an average of $147 per 
trainee. The TGF beneficiaries comprised the poorest people (38.1%), school leavers 
(25.2%), orphans (15.1%), widows (9.9%), crippled demobilized soldiers (6.3%), and 
handicapped (5.5%). Half of the beneficiaries were women. Based on a tracer study on 
training outcomes, the average employment rate among graduates was 66 percent, 
including 75 percent for women and just 59 percent for men. Categorized by type of 
: (i) The Training Grant Fund (TGF), 
a grant facility for training providers contracted to do training for certain group of 
trainees in certain skill areas; and (ii) The Self-employment Generation Fund (SEGF), a 
micro-credit loan facility for small entrepreneurs in both urban and rural areas.  
                                                 
11 Sources:  ADB.  Project Documents: 
•  August 1995.  RRP: Cambodia Basic Skills Project.  RRP:CAM 27411. 
•  Project Completion Report (PCR): 2003.  Basic Skills Project (Cambodia) (Loan 1368-CAM[SF]), 
N.181-03, 4 August. 
•  9 September 2005.  Project Performance Audit Report (PPAR): Basic Skills Project (Cambodia).  
Operations Evaluation Department.  IN.253-05. 
12 The project included a third fund, the Innovative Skills Investment Assistance Fund (ISIAF), a loan 
facility for private training providers offering innovative training to their own target clientele for a fee. The 
ISIAF trained almost 12,000 trainees but was discontinued because of default by one of the sub-contractors.  
The money was eventually recovered.   
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beneficiaries, the employment rate ranged from a low of 55 percent among school leavers 
to full employment among demobilized soldiers. An estimated 80 percent of those who 
found employment did so in the informal sector. The average income of those who found 
employment ranged from $32-$73 per month. This may not seem like much, but when 
benchmarked against the $25 per month average salary of public servants, the impact of 
TGF was significant on the income of beneficiaries. The TGF had no cost recovery. 
Training fees could not be charged because the beneficiaries were very poor and had to 
be provided assistance in transportation and food during the training period. But, in terms 
of employment generation, the TGF was efficient, requiring only an average investment 
of $222 per employed beneficiary. 
The Self-employment Generation Fund (SEGF) was a micro-credit program 
patterned after the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Loan amounts generally ranged from 
$200–$3,000.  By December 2002 the SEGF, through the provincial training centers, had 
disbursed $1.4 million (including re-lending) to 5,650 members in 1,750 groups in 15 
provinces; 65% were women. The SEGF beneficiaries engaged in a wide variety of 
micro-enterprises such as algae and seaweed growing, bamboo basket making, animal 
raising, food processing, hairdressing, motorbike repair, onion growing, television and 
radio service and repair, silk weaving, masonry, stone carving, worm raising. Selection of 
eligible businesses was preceded by a training and employment needs assessment 
(TENA) conducted by the provincial training centers, and by rudimentary feasibility 
studies. The high collection rates (around 92 percent) indicated that the SEGF businesses 
were doing well. The average income from such businesses ranged from $400 to $900 
per annum, a significant amount, especially in the countryside.  
The experience of the two NTF programs, the TGF and SEGF, was encouraging. 
Their impacts on the poor were direct, concrete, and substantial, and with relatively small 
investments. The TGF proved to be an efficient way to empower the poor by providing 
employable skills, either for wage or self-employment. The SEGF provided concrete 
opportunities for TGF graduates to apply acquired skills for self-employment. However, 
the operations of both programs would need  to be scaled up to reach more target 
beneficiaries.   
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The National Training Fund continued to operate using government funds 
(program budget) after closure of the Project.  The procedures for competitive award of 
contracts, and use of unit costs for pricing the training are still in use.  Thus, the 
institutional development gains from the project appear to be sustained.  There were 
several limitations, however.  The use of low unit costs in the competition for contracts 
effectively excluded private training providers.  Only government institutions and NGOs 
that have already sunk costs in teacher salaries could afford to compete.  Some 
adjustments need to be made to provide incentives for private providers to compete.  Red 
tape makes it difficult to spend fully the government program budget allocated to the 
NTF. As a result some of the intended programs could not be financed.   
Achievements and limitations of equity-oriented training funds 
Based on the foregoing cases and analysis, several advantages and limitations can 
be identified of training funds.  First, they appear often to be successful in reaching their 
objectives of training for the informal sector.  It is less clear about the quality of training 
imparted, but the few tracer studies available (Cote d’Ivoire and Cambodia), the 
economic impacts can be considerable. Second, they appear to be successful in pooling 
different types of resources for spending on a unified set of priorities.  In some cases this 
has led to mobilization of additional resources for training (e.g. PNG).  Third, Fund 
procedures can lead to efficiencies in the use of resources (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire, the use of 
unit cost parameters in Cambodia and PNG).  Fourth, the availability of funds on a 
competitive basis can help stimulate a training market in some cases (Cote d’Ivoire, 
PNG).  In addition, accreditation of training providers presumably had a positive impact 
on training quality.  Fifth, employer representatives can agree on cross-subsidization of 
informal sector training, and some even see the benefits as they use informal sector 
enterprises for sub-contracts. (Cote d’Ivoire, West African cases). The most basic 
challenge for donor-financed training funds is sustainability – how to continue operations 
beyond the life of the project when relying on limited government financing.  The PNG 
case shows an innovative means to address the problem – the use of a trust fund with 
interest earned earmarked for training finance  
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The limitations of training funds are also evident from these cases.  Just by 
introducing competitive procedures does not, by itself, create training markets. Such 
training markets apparently did not occur in other West African countries (Mali, Benin 
and Burkina Faso), in part because the base of training providers was too narrow.  
Underutilization of available funds points to the need for efficient procedures adapted to 
the capacities of potential providers and beneficiaries (West Africa, Cambodia, PNG).  
The decision-making structures in PNG and Cambodia appear to have been overly 
complicated.   
Evidence of impact evaluation in equity-oriented training funds is, again, patchy.  
Two of the training funds – Cote d’Ivoire and Cambodia -- incorporated extensive tracer 
studies.  The Cambodia study related impact to costs in the form of cost per employed 
beneficiary.  However, the final evaluation of the other donor-financed equity funds 
merely enumerated the outputs.  The levy-financed equity fund in South Africa, NSF, has 
conducted no evaluations of impact beyond target achievement since its creation in 2000.  
This points to a lack of rigor in evaluation.  
Table 5.1 summarizes the advantages and limitations of equity-oriented training funds: 
Table 6.  Achievements and Limitations of Equity Training Funds  
Strengths  Weaknesses/Risks 
Can stimulate grass roots (training institutions, 
enterprises) interest and innovation in upgrading 
training programs 
Risk spreading funds too thinly so that 
recipients lack a critical mass of financing  
Can unify various sources of funding for training  Can be hijacked by certain interest groups 
Can benefit a wide range of training providers  May divert resources for non-training purposes 
Can finance a wide array of training arrangements 
and delivery methods (long, short, institution or 
enterprise-based); Guidelines can be adapted to 
new priorities.  
Can fail to be sustained when external donor 
financing ends. 
Can allocate funds in line with national policies and 
priorities.  
May not include sufficient stakeholders in 
governance, e.g.Mali. 
Can address the needs of training for the informal 
sector in low-income countries 
May not disburse available funds because of 
cumbersome procedures  
Can enhance system performance through 
accreditation of training providers and competition 
for funds. 
Lack of rigorous evaluation 
Can raise incomes of those in the informal sector   
Sources:  Adapted from Ziderman 2003 and Johanson, ADB 2009.  
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The next chapter poses key questions and draws some lessons of good practice in 
the design of the three main types of training funds. 
VI.  KEY QUESTIONS AND GOOD PRACTICE IN TRAINING FUNDS 
Some concerns tend to be common across all three types of training funds.  Others 
are specific to levy or equity funds. 
6.1  Common Concerns 
6.1.1  Governance 
In levy-based funds countries that allocate a leading role to employers tend to be 
successful  –  e.g. Brazil, Singapore.  However, balanced, tripartite governance 
(employers, unions, government)  can also be successful – as in Cote d’Ivoire.  However, 
over-control by government can have deleterious results (e.g., Togo). In Hungary 
employers felt that government exerted excessive control over funds and limited their 
effectiveness (Dar, et. al., 2003)  Allowing employers to have a major -- if not majority -- 
say on fund allocations can go a long way to gaining their support for the levy.  This is 
done in Brazil, where the employers control the allocation of training levies, and also 
largely in Singapore. The matter of governance and oversight is equally important in 
equity training funds.  An example of good practice was the CNFTP in Madagascar on 
which ten of the 12 members represented employers.  Where funds aim at assisting 
workers in the informal sector, representation by informal sector associations is 
appropriate. 
6.1.2  Allocations 
Who decides on the allocation of money to beneficiaries, and based on what 
criteria?  What role will employers and workers play in allocating the funds? Their 
participation is crucial for success. -- Advice: if possible, give employers a strong, even 
majority, voice in allocations of funds they provide to ensure relevance (Madagascar 
CNFTP).  
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6.1.3  Administrative Autonomy, Capacity and Efficiency 
Administrative capacity is essential. Most successful levy-financed training funds 
in Latin America and elsewhere have a high degree of administrative independence.  
Administrative efficiency is required to reduce red tape and ease access to funds by 
deserving firms.  The Singapore SDF, French levy-exemption scheme and the Malaysian 
levy-reimbursement schemes exemplify well administered programs (Gasskov 1994 in 
Dar et. al. 2003) Transparency in decision-making is also important, as practiced in the 
Singapore SDF and Chile’s FONCAP. 
6.1.4  Competition 
The levy systems in France and Cote d’Ivoire actively encourage competition 
among training providers and development of training markets. Chile’s FONCAP, an 
equity fund, finances training only through competitive bids from among one thousand 
registered and pre-approved training providers. Competition for funds was incorporated 
into several donor-financed equity training funds.  Those that fostered competition among 
training providers tended to help stimulate training markets (PNG).  In Cote d’Ivoire 
private training providers garnered the lion’s share of the contracts awarded under 
competitive bidding (Annex 5.1).  Competition also led to lower unit training costs in 
Cote d’Ivoire and PNG. However, in Cambodia unit costs for training were set so low 
they effectively eliminated private providers.  Without a sufficiently wide spectrum of 
training providers, attempts at competition did not succeed (i.e. bids failed) in Burkina 
Faso, Mali and Benin. 
6.1.5  Support for Small Enterprises 
Both enterprise funds and equity funds attempted partly to assist small enterprises.  
Small enterprises operate under tight constraints that militate against participation in 
training, e.g. cash flow problems, inability to release workers for training, lack of 
knowledge and expertise about training.  Malaysia and Singapore (Box 2.3) exemplify 
good practice in tailoring services to small enterprises through vouchers (to relieve 
problems of cash flow), technical assistance to assess needs and design programs, making 
deliver flexible to avoid time constraints felt by small enterprises and simplification of 
administrative procedures. Chile’s FONCAP uses intermediaries to organize and contract  
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training for groups of small enterprises, something they would not have capacity to do by 
themselves.  Several equity training funds were able to provide skills to people working 
in the informal sector (Cote d’Ivoire, Cambodia, PNG.) 
6.1.6  Evaluation of Outcomes and Impact 
Few training funds went beyond enumeration of outputs (e.g. persons trained) to 
analyze impact (e.g. employment, worker productivity) and impact (e.g. increased 
individual incomes or company profits).  Two donor-supported equity funds did this – 
Cote d’Ivoire and Cambodia – but only Cambodia compared the impact to training costs. 
Clearly, more and better evaluation is needed on the performance of training funds. 
6.2  Levy-financed Training Funds 
Levy schemes have had a positive impact on quantity of in-service training of 
workers.  At least quantitatively, training levies achieved their objective of increasing the 
incidence of enterprise-based  training. (Brazil, Singapore, Malaysia, South Africa).  
However, the benefits of levy-financed training funds were not evenly distributed.  They 
tended to mirror the incidence of enterprise-based training in general. Larger firms 
benefit disproportionately.  Smaller firms rarely participated for reasons explained above. 
“Small and mid-sized employers have rarely benefited from payroll levies in any country 
for which we have available evidence.” (Dar, et. al.2003)  Some levy funds accumulated 
significant surpluses (Zimbabwe, Colombia) which led in part to significant overstaffing 
(Nigeria Industrial Training Fund.)  Revenue-generating funds that gave preferential 
financing to their own training institutions tended to crowd out other training providers 
(Kenya,  Department of Industrial Training; Tanzania.) Other funds suffered under 
excessive government control (Hungary, Togo), or excessive red tape (Korea, in Gasskov 
1994).  
The following list synthesizes good practices in the design and operation of levy-financed 
training funds
13
                                                 
13 Source:  Much of this is adapted from Ziderman 2003. 
.  
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6.2.1  Appropriateness 
Avoid premature introduction of payroll levies.  Payroll levies may not be 
appropriate in low income countries where the industrial base is limited and levy-income 
generating capacity is weak.  Therefore a primary requirement is a sufficient number of 
formal sector enterprises with sufficient income to generate revenue. In low-income 
countries the industrial base may be too narrow, or the majority of enterprises located in 
the informal sector so as to preclude payroll levies 
6.2.2  Employer Buy-in 
Employer-buy-in for levy schemes is crucial. Extensive consultations and 
consensus with employers is essential on the need and benefits before introducing a levy 
scheme. Enterprises often see as an additional tax that they will recoup by lowering 
wages of the workers. Employers need to be consulted early and thoroughly – something 
that was not done in Tanzania and for which the levy scheme still lacks employer 
support. 
6.2.3  Conflict of Interest 
Funds that give preference to institutions they own (Tanzania, Kenya, formerly in 
Mauritius) have an inherent conflict of interest. Giving preference to a funding agency’s 
own institutions can crowd out other (private, NGO) training providers. In Kenya and 
Tanzania, with the levy going to support training institutions owned by the training 
authority, non-governmental providers of craft training tend to be neglected. (Adams and 
Fretwell, 1997 in Dar, et. al., 2003). This is also a tendency in Brazil where SENAI 
operates its own network of training institutions. (Annex 3.1)  There are exceptions to 
this rule, however, as in TPAF of Fiji which produces excellent training in its own 
institutions (ADB 2008). Generally, however, training agencies and funds should avoid a 
direct training role, as does Chile’s SENCE. 
6.2.4  Cross-subsidization 
What share of the fund, if any, should be devoted to “cross-subsidization”, e.g. 
training for those in the informal sector, or for small enterprises that have not 
contributed?  Cross-subsidization allows funds to be channeled to priorities outside the  
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immediate collection area.  Colombia (SENA), Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Benin all permitted funds raised from formal sector enterprises to be spent on training of 
workers in the informal sector.  In South Africa cross subsidization is built into the levy 
design: 20 percent of levy proceeds are allocated to the National Skills Fund for 
equalizing access to skills.  
6.2.5  Global versus Sectoral Coverage 
A standard, national payroll levy is preferred to a sectoral levy for its greater 
ability to permit funds to be allocated where training needs are greatest. On the other 
hand, keeping funds in the sector where they were collected can increase the sense of 
ownership of training. Brazil has relatively few sectoral training funds (five) compared 
with the highly fragmented system of 23 sectoral authorities in South Africa, many of 
which may not be viable in size.  Sectoral levies are more common in Europe (Annex 
2.2), particularly in the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands – but most of these are the 
result of collective bargaining and sufficient administrative capacity exists to operate 
them.  On balance, national levies are preferable in developing countries as they foster an 
integrated, national approach to skills development and require comparatively less 
administrative capacity than sectoral funds. 
6.2.6  Periodically Revised Levy Rate 
Experiences in Latin America (Venezuela) and Africa (Zimbabwe, Mauritius) 
show that a rate too high may lead to surpluses and lavish bureaucracies The lesson, 
therefore, is to adjust the rate periodically to ensure that the training is neither 
underfunded nor leads to surpluses. In Mauritius the rate was lowered when surpluses 
emerged. 
6.2.7  Levy Collection 
Use effective agents. How to collect the funds efficiently without costing more in 
administrative expenses than the levy collects –  integrating the levy collection with 
collection of taxes (South Africa) or social security often works; separate collection by a 
training agency usually does not (Kenya, Tanzania).  
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6.2.8  Security of Levy Proceeds 
Avoid diversion to other purposes, including treasury confiscation. Levy funds 
should not be used for other government expenses, as has happened in the past in Costa 
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire briefly, The Gambia and Togo (Box 2.1). Funds should be earmarked 
to be used only for training purposes, avoiding extraneous activities. 
6.2.9  Types of Levies 
Which work best, and under what circumstances?  Pre-employment funds 
supported by revenue-generation schemes should be seen as an initial means to establish 
national training institutions, to be augmented later by more cost-effective systems such 
as employer training incentives.  All three types of in-service (enterprise incentive) 
schemes require administrative capacity and to an extent impose barriers to access by 
firms.  Levy-grant mechanisms have the advantage of being able to address national 
priorities directly.  Cost-reimbursement schemes can impose a high administrative burden 
on the training fund.  Levy-exemption may have the disadvantage of a “leveling effect,” 
i.e. firms that would otherwise have invested more in training tend to reduce their effort 
to that required by law. More evaluation is needed to determine the relative cost-
effectiveness of the different types of levies. 
6.3  Equity Training Funds 
Equity-oriented training funds can be an effective alternative to levy-financed 
funds in low-income countries where levy financing may not be feasible.  Three cases 
presented (Cote d’Ivoire, PNG and Cambodia) demonstrated that donor-financed training 
funds can provide income-generating and income-increasing skills to vulnerable groups 
in the informal sector.  They also stimulated competition among providers and achieved 
efficiencies by reducing unit costs of training.  
Not as much evidence is available to provide examples of good practice for equity 
training funds.  Still, equity-oriented training funds need to be designed to answer the 
following questions:  
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6.3.1  Targeting 
The whole point of equity funds is to provide training services to disadvantaged 
groups.  These groups are often dispersed in rural areas and not part of organized 
production.  The cases in Cote d’Ivoire, PNG and Cambodia illustrate the importance of 
information campaigns and decentralized fund operations in reaching rural populations.  
In particular, employers in the informal sector often do not see the value of training in 
improving profits.  Information campaigns are one means to change this view.  The fund 
secretariat in Cote d’Ivoire had to be reorganized by adding a unit to deal with informal 
sector sub-projects. 
6.3.2  Fund Allocations  
Will funds be allocated to pre-determined quotas for funding “windows”, or open-
ended in response to applications? How many windows can be serviced effectively? Will 
stakeholders be able to generate their own proposals? Proliferation of windows and sub-
windows should be avoided– (South Africa’s NSF has nine main funding windows and 
nine sub-windows – too many to administer effectively; Chile’s FONCAP had twelve 
programs of widely varying size.) 
6.3.3  Eligibility to Receive Funds  
Will Private Training Institutions Be Eligible To Receive Funds – Both Non-
Profit and For-Profit? If so, on what terms? (Chile exemplifies good practice in using 
competition among pre-approved private training providers.  Cote d’Ivoire, Cambodia 
and PNG also financed training through private trainers. 
6.3.4  How Will Quality Be Ensured in the Delivery of Training? 
In some cases (e.g. Chile FONCAP) training providers are pre-screened and have 
to meet minimum criteria to be able to receive funds.  Development of training packages 
also helps to ensure standard content that meet quality requirements (as was done in Cote 
d’Ivoire and PNG).  However, few funds require testing for competencies acquired as a 
result of the training.  
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6.3.5  How Will the Use of Funds Be Accounted for and Audited In Specific Sub-
Projects and Contracts? 
This can become complex when numerous training providers win contracts.  
Proper accounting and auditing of  sub-project funds must be designed before 
disbursements start. South Africa initially had trouble with venal practices in several of 
its SETAs. 
6.3.6  Complementary Inputs 
In both Cote d’Ivoire and PNG lack of other necessary inputs (water, micro-credit 
and marketing) limited the impact on beneficiaries.  Good practice would ensure the 
availability of such complementary inputs. 
6.3.7  Sustainability 
How will the funds be replenished? This is a crucial question for donor-financed 
funds.  Donors can build the financing platform, but there needs to be a permanent source 
of financing for the Fund, e.g. government revenues, payroll tax or annuity.  The PNG 
case is instructive on establishing a trust fund for training (Box 5.3). 
6.4  Unanswered Questions: An Agenda for Future Research 
This review has uncovered mainly anecdotal, descriptive evidence of what 
training funds have done. Evaluation of training funds is patchy. The level of rigor in 
evaluating training funds appears to be relatively low.  Most evaluations were simple 
enumerations of outputs against targets without controls to judge the net impact.  No 
examples were found of carefully designed quasi-  or random experimental studies.  
Therefore several basic questions remain unanswered, such as whether one type of fund 
is more effective in achieving objectives than another type; whether incentive-based 
levies actually stimulate more enterprise-based training than without the levy; the extent 
to which training costs have been lowered and private training markets have been 
stimulated.  More rigorous and systematic evaluation is needed of training funds of their 
impact.  Monitoring and evaluation of training funds may be one of the most effective 
ways for governments, employers and workers to foster the development of relevant and 
cost-effective training systems (Dar et. al. 2003).   
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In view of the vast amounts spent through training funds and the unanswered 
questions, it would make sense for researchers to undertake a more intensive review of 
selected country cases. Such research could analyze in depth the role played by different 
types of funds in improving the performance and outcomes of training offered by public 
and private providers. This study would look for evidence of how funds improve training 
market outcomes  by (i) opening the market to training and competition, (ii) making 
public and private providers eligible for fund financing,  (iii) engaging employers in 
governance, (iv) strengthening the link between training and market demand, (v) 
establishing quality standards and incentives, (vi) formulas that finance accredited 
providers, (vii) expanding access to skills by targeting financing for disadvantaged 
groups, (viii) serving as a means to coordinate public expenditure on skills development 
and (ix) ensuring fund use to meet strategic national and local goals for skills 
development. For each of the three main types of funds, the review would select several 
countries for further study of its governance and organizational structure, rules and 
procedures governing disbursement of training support, strategies for promoting 
enterprise training (especially by smaller enterprises) and reaching disadvantaged and 
under-served labor market groups, characteristics of beneficiaries (firms by employment 
size, trainees by gender, rural-urban residence, income status), and results from 
evaluation studies of the fund’s performance and outcomes, if available.  The country 
studies would add depth and further insight into lessons of good practice in the design 
and operation of training funds (Adams 2008b).  
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Annex 2.1  Statement to the National Assembly by Ministry of Labor, Republic of 
South Africa, on introduction of the bill on training levies, 3 March 
1999 
“There are eight points I wish to make regarding the case for a national skills levy in 
South Africa:  
First, a general case can be made that there are large training externalities across the 
economy currently. A skills levy will establish collusive training behaviour across all 
sectors of the economy, fostering the complementarities between education/training and 
innovation, technological and workplace change.  
Second, the premium that firms are placing on skilled personnel appears to be leading to 
high labour turnover. To the extent that this is true it will have a strong disincentive effect 
on training. The levy ensures that all companies make a basic contribution towards 
training in their sector. If they choose not to utilise their funds to undertake their own 
training, they will at least have made their fair contribution to skills formation.  
Third, the primary purpose of the levy is to raise the base of training in the country, and 
to improve the quality of this training. Small and medium sized companies will be 
encouraged to begin training and to develop a sustainable training capability, while larger 
companies will be encouraged to systematise the training they do and to target more of 
their training at the upgrading of personnel at the lower end of the occupational structure. 
The control of levy funds by employers and unions raises the accountability and 
relevance of training done under these schemes. Individual employers will have direct 
access to their levy contributions through grants, which reimburse them for the costs of 
their own training. This link provides a direct incentive for companies to invest in the 
training of their workforce.  
Fourth, part of the funds will be used to finance learnerships in order to meet entry-level 
skills needs on a sector wide basis, and improve opportunities for our youth to access 
workplace experience, thereby improving their employability.   
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Fifth, whether enterprise or learnership education and training, the levy provides an 
instrument for locating these funds in the hands of industry, thereby increasing the 
alignment of education and training provision to the needs of industry.  
Sixth, the levy will provide the resources for transforming the existing, and establishing 
new training infrastructure. This training infrastructure is critical to overcoming the 
information and resource constraints facing small and medium companies, to comply 
with the levy, access grants and undertake appropriate training programmes. It will also 
contribute towards the establishment of national qualifications framework (NQF) 
capacity within industry.  
Seventh, the levy will contribute towards worker Adult Basic Education (ABE) 
programmes. Employers generally view this as government's responsibility, but we are all 
aware of the legacy that apartheid education has left us with.  
Eighth, the design of this levy will strengthen the existing voluntary schemes, by 
improving compliance and improving the efficiency of collection. It will also expand the 
coverage of training to sectors of the economy where there has been little or no training, 
and to occupational groups that have previously been neglected.” 
Source:  Minister of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana: The Skills Development Levies Bill, National 
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1% - half each 
by employers, 
employees          
2  BOLIVIA  INFOCAL 
1%- 
voluntary  n.a.       
3a  BRAZIL  SENAI  1%           
3b  “  “  SENAC  1%           
3c  “  “  SENAR  Value of prod.           
3d  “  “  SENAT  1.5%           
4  COLOMBIA  SENA  2%           
5  COSTA RICA  INA  1.5%           
6 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC  INFOTEP  1%           
7  ECUADOR  SECAP  0.5%           
8  EL SALVADOR  INSAFORP  1%           
9  GUATEMALA  INTECAP  0.98%           
10  HONDURAS  INFOP  1%           
11  JAMAICA 
Heart Trust 
/NTA  3%             
12  NICARAGUA  INATEC  2%           
13  PANAMA  INADEH 
15% of soc. 
Sec. fund  n.a.       
14  PARAGUAY  SNPP  1%           
15a  PERU  SENCICO 
0.0025 of 
spending on 
labor, materials  n.a.       
15b  “ “  SENATI  0.75%           
16  URUGUAY  CONET  0.25%   n.a.       
17  VENEZUELA  INCES  2%           
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
1  BENIN  FODEFCA  2%           
2  BURKINA FASO  FAFPA  4%*         
3  BOTSWANA  BOTA 
0.2% of 
turnover, new          
4  COTE D’IVOIRE  FDFP  0.4% + 1.2%            































6  KENYA  NITC  Sectoral           
7  MALAWI  TEVETA  1%            
8  MALI  FAFPA  0.5%           
9  MAURITIUS  HRDC/NTF  1%             
10  NAMIBIA  NTF  1%, new            
11  NIGERIA  ITF  1.25%             
12  SENEGAL  ONFP  3%           
13  SOUTH AFRICA 
NSF + 23 
sectoral 
funds 
(SETAs)  1%            
14  TANZANIA  VETA  2%           
15  TOGO    1%          
16  ZAIRE    1%           
17  ZIMBABWE  ZIMDEF  1%            
MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA 
1  ALGERIA  FNAC  0.5%           
2  BAHRAIN    1-3%           
3  EGYPT  N.A. 
2003 Law- 1% 
company 
profits         





profits tax           
5  MOROCCO  OFPPT  1.6%           
6  TUNISIA  FOPROFA  2%           
7  TURKEY  N.A.  N.A.           
EUROPE 
1  BELGIUM 
11 Sector 
Training 
Funds  0.1-0.6%          
2  CYPRUS  HRDA  0.5%          
3  DENMARK  10-15 STFs 
Fixed amt. per 
worker; 0.23% 
in state sector          
4  FRANCE  OPCA  1.5%           
5  GREECE  LAEK  0.45%          
6  HUNGARY  DTF  1.5%           
7  ITALY 
14 sectoral 
VT funds  0.3%          
































up to 2.5%            
10  POLAND  n.a.  1% in 2008      n.a.   
11  SLOVENIA  n.a. 
1%  -craft 
sector      n.a.   
12  SPAIN  FORCEM  0.6-1.0%          
13  SWEDEN  TSL  n.a.          






SSDA  0.5%-2.5%          
ASIA & PACIFIC 
1  FIJI  TPAF               
2  KOREA 
Dis-
continued  0.5%?           
3  MALAYSIA  HRDF 
1.0%, with 
0.5% for small 
businesses 








workers          
5  NEW ZEALAND  n.a. 
Varies by 
sector          
6  SINGAPORE  SDF 









continued            
Note:  * Of which only part is allocated for training. In addition, some sources refer to training 
levies used at one time in Hong Kong, Argentina, Germany (voluntary), Haiti, Mauritania, Mexico 
(production-financed training levy in construction), and Iceland but information was not sufficient 
to include them. 
Sources:  Latin America and Caribbean: CINTERFOR vocational training map;  Africa: 
AfDB/OECD 2008, and Ziderman 2003;  Europe: CEDEFOP 2008; ETF 2006. Other sources: Dar 
et. al. 2003; Galhardi 2002. 
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Annex 3.1  SENAI and the “S” Training Corporations in Brazil
14
Table 1- Training Corporations in Brazil 
   
Organization  Representing  Year Created  Financing 
SENAI  Industry  1942  A “general” levy of 1 percent of monthly 
payroll, and an “additional” levy of 0.5 
percent on industries with more than 500 
employees. 
SENAC  Commerce  1946  1% of payroll (“hoja de pago) of all 
commercial and service sector 
enterprises 
SENAR  Agriculture  1980s  2.5 % tax on the sale of  agricultural 
products 
SENAT  Land transport  1993  1 % on land transport firms, including 
self employed (“trabajadores 
autonomos”) owners of taxis and trucks   
SEBRAE  Technical 
assistance for 
micro and small 
enterprises 
1980s  0.3 percent payroll levy on all sectors 
SESCOOP  Urban 
cooperatives 
1999   
Source:  Created from information in Leite, p.90-91; and ILO/CINTERFOR. 
Brazil pioneered the establishment of autonomous institutions responsible for the training 
of the manpower required by the economy. Funded by payroll taxes and developed as 
distinct from the school system, this model was conceived as one of the instruments 
needed to face the challenges of industrialization (Atchoarena 2006). 
All are privately managed and financed through levies. The “S” organizations are 
administered by the National Federations of Employers (Industry, Commerce, 
Agriculture and Transport); these corporations are private associations with the exception 
of SENAR which has a tripartite board involving employees' representatives.  For most 
of the “Ss”, the levies are collected by the National Security Service (INSS) for a 1 
percent administrative fee on the amounts collected. Both SENAI and SENAC operate 
exemption tax schemes or agreements that allow enterprises to operate their own training 
institutions or programs. Government subsidies complement the budget. 
                                                 
14 Sources:  Leite, “Financiamiento de la formación profesional en América Latina y el Caribe. Un estudio 
comparativo de buenas prácticas” Chapter III , “El Mercado de la Formacion Profesional en Brasil,” 
CINTERFOR; ADB 1997 “Skills Promotion Funds,” Chapter III –  Revenue Generating Schemes; 
Atchoarena 2006; and <SENAI.org>.   
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The “S” organizations invest approximately US$2.5 billion per annum in skills training, 
(Leite, 94)  SENAC and SENAI have endeavored to charge fees for its training courses 
since the 1980s, but this source of income amounts to no more than 30 percent and 10 
percent, respectively, of their annual budgets. 
SENAI, SENAR and SENAC run 1,500 units or schools with an overall enrolment of 3.7 
million. The “S” organizations offer mainly short term training – about 80 percent of the 
enrollment is concentrated in courses of 20-80 hours.  In addition, they offer training at 
the secondary level and SENAI and SENAC have started offering post-secondary 
education and training. (Leite, 69-70).  In practice, the major Brazilian VTIs operate as 
training cooperatives. Rather than actually buying training services, Brazilian enterprises 
receive free training and upgrading courses in return for their contributions.  In addition,  
Brazil has significantly expanded an incentive system, known as a co-financing 
agreement, to support the growth of enterprise-based training. The co-financing 
agreement is a private contract between VTI and an enterprise concerning payroll levy. 
Instead of paying the levy in full to the Government and obtaining training from VTI 
employers establish direct relationships with VTIs for that proportion of the levy to be 
spent on enterprise-based training.  
SENAI 
SENAI is the National Industrial Training Service. SENAI’s mission is :” "To contribute 
to the strengthening of the industry and the full sustainable development of the country, 
promoting the education for work, citizenship, technical and technological assistance and 
the production and dissemination of information, adaptation, generation and 
dissemination of technology". (<SENAI.br>) 
SENAI structure --  The SENAI is organized in a federal system with one national 
department and 27 regional departments, which are administrated by the National 
Confederation of the Industry-NCI. SENAI is governed by employers through the 
National Confederation of Industry. The SENAI adopted a regional structure, partly due 
to the size of the country and its federal nature. The National Council, headed by the 
President of the National Confederation of Industry, comprises representatives of various  
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industrial sectors, as well as those of fisheries, transportation and communications, 
officials from both the Ministries of Education and of Labor and the Presidents of the 
Regional Councils. The National Department is mainly in charge of providing overall 
normative guidance, technical assistance and co-ordination. The Regional Councils have 
a pattern of membership similar to the one adopted at the national level. They are the 
executive arms of SENAI and operate the vocational training centers as well as provide 
training and related services to the enterprises. Workers’ organizations are not 
represented in the SENAI management bodies. (Atchoarena) 
Distribution of revenues. SENAI’s central administration absorbs 1 per cent of funds 
raised to cover related costs and further retains 15 per cent of the general contribution for 
its running expenditures, as well as the product of the additional tax. The balance of the 
general contribution (85 per cent) is transferred to the regional bodies. The retention of 
funds at the central level enables SENAI to perform a redistributive function by 
allocating supplementary resources to disadvantaged regions, such as the Northeast, or to 
support priority programs. 
Failure of tax rebates. In 1975, the revenue-raising scheme was complemented by a tax-
rebate incentive. This arrangement provided training enterprises with the possibility of 
deducting, within an upper limit, twice the amount of their training bill from their income 
tax. The tax rebate was subject to the prior approval of the enterprise’s training plans. 
Such an option reflected a Government strategy to boost in-company training, in view of 
improving labour productivity. However, it was suspended in 1990 for an indefinite 
period, within the framework of broader orthodox fiscal measures. a careful analysis 
showed that only 1 per cent of the taxable companies took advantage of this device. The 
heaviness of the procedure for approval was sometimes identified as an obstacle to the 
system. The fiscal incentive was, in fact, taken up by the large companies from São 
Paulo, which used it to further consolidate their training policies. The impact on other 
industrial sectors and states remained limited.  Therefore, the tax-rebate facility did 
contribute to an expansion of the training effort, but in a way that further increased the 
training gap between regions and categories of enterprises. (Atchoarena)   
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Company training agreements. The effort to promote company training led SENAI to 
sign specific financing agreements with large enterprises. The co-financing agreements, 
conceived as an alternative way of developing enterprise-based training, have shown 
rather positive results, as indicated by a rapid increase in the number of contracts. 
However, this trend has also confirmed a bias towards large firms. Major agreements are 
signed with companies having their own training centre. The participation of smaller 
companies remains marginal. Since the 1990s, however, the expansion of company 
training agreements has slowed considerably, and are now mostly concentrated in the Sao 
Paulo area. 
Scope and Achievements.  The SENAI’s training infrastructure embraces a great 
diversity of elements, including over 500 various types of vocational training centers, 
more than 200 mobile training units and several personnel development centers. Many of 
these institutions are joint ventures operated in co-operation with industry. Major training 
activities combine in-centre pre-employment vocational training, an apprenticeship 
scheme and continuing vocational education, including company-based programs. This 
diversified training structure and strategy has allowed SENAI to train, since 1942, more 
than 10 million people. The institution is responsible for the training of 2.8 million people 
per year, the administration of a network  of 726 operational units and 30 million 
enrolling in more than 58 years. (SENAI.br) 
Apprenticeship, managed by SENAI, constitutes another financing modality of training. 
It is compulsory for enterprises to employ, and enroll. in SENAI centers, a number of 14 
to 18 year-old apprentices ranging from an equivalent of 5 per cent to 15 per cent of their 
ordinary workforce. During the first half of their training, apprentices receive half the 
minimum wage. This income increases to two-thirds of the base salary for the second part 
of the learning period and uses the revenues of a payroll tax to provide training to 2.8 
million professionals per year in its own captive training centers. 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
The Brazilian levy system has been operational and successful for over fifty years and 
has fulfilled its major goal of strengthening national training institutions. The payroll tax  
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has obviously contributed to the development of a strong training system, focusing on 
long-term training programs. The Brazilian system demonstrated a strong capacity, in a 
changing labor market, to diversify its sources of income as well as its provision of 
services to firms. This flexibility and the close links established with enterprises are 
certainly the result of an appropriate mixture of institutional and financial arrangements.  
One of SENAI’s major assets is its close relationship to industry and its needs. Such a 
close linkage is largely due to the financial participation of the employers and to the 
design of the governing bodies of the system. The Brazilian revenue-generating levy 
scheme offers several important advantages over similar schemes in other countries. It 
provides funds for private VET institutions thus reducing the gap between training supply 
and demand with positive implications for the cost-effectiveness of financing. Secondly, 
the levy now bypasses the government budget and goes directly to the training 
corporations. As a result, the monetary value of the levy is protected against inflation and 
the financial flexibility of training institutions is improved.  
Administrative independence, a hybrid status combining private ownership and public 
mission, a management structure, including industrial and governmental representatives, 
probably accounted for most of SENAI’s achievements. 
SENAI’s main weaknesses center on lack of competition, bias towards large companies 
and inadequate incentives for enterprise-based training. 
1.  The expansion of SENAI’s network of training institutions is sometimes said to have 
generated a quasi-monopoly or, at least, given it a dominant position, which has 
impaired the development of a competitive training market. SENAI and SENAC have 
monopolized the training market and, through their levy-based financing, have bound 
most enterprises to their brand of centrally developed, standardized training programs 
which provide few opportunities for shop-floor worker training.  
2.  The allocation mechanisms have not been able to operate a redistribution of funds in a 
manner which significantly reduces the disparities of access between the various 
regions, between the size of the enterprise, and between the category of worker. 
(Atchoarena)   
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3.  The major deficiency of revenue-generating levies -  their inability to provide 
incentives for employer training - is very apparent in Brazil. Neither SENAI nor 
SENAC have new incentives to offer to the steadily increasing number of industrial 
enterprises providing financing to workers.  
4.  In addition, many enterprises pay the levy but are not concerned with either receiving 
training services or with signing a training agreement. The number of agreements is 
still very small and local markets do not send strong signals to employers to train and, 
in general, employers show little concern for training.  (ADB, Chapter III.)   
Finally, the non representation of labor interests might resist the evolution of social forces 
and the trend towards further democratization. 
Annex 3.2  Hungary- Vocational Training Fund 
In Hungary enterprises make a contribution to the funding of initial vocational education 
and training (VET) in the school system and  the provision of continuing vocational 
training (CVT) for employees through a tax of 1.5% of wage costs. The tax levied on 
enterprises finances the Development and Training Sub-fund of the Labor Market Fund. 
The tax is referred to as the ‘vocational training contribution’. Up to one-third of the tax 
(0.2% until 1999, 0.5% now) can be spent by companies on CVT for their own 
employees, but only on training programs included in the National Vocational 
Qualification Register. This condition is fulfilled through prior agreement given by the 
County Training Committee. Up to 75% of the tax can be contributed directly to 
vocational schools, for the organization of practical training for students, or to cover the 
costs of training in money or in kind, or by providing direct financing. Since 2001, direct 
support can also be given to higher education institutions. The remainder is paid into the 
Vocational Training Fund, which has a decentralized and a centralized component.  
The decentralized component is devolved to the level of municipalities on a student per 
capita basis and may be used at the discretion of the municipalities within a framework of 
eligible measures drawn up by the Minister of Education on the advice of the National 
Vocational and Training Council (NVTC). The centralized component is used on the 
authority of the Minister of Education following advice from the NVTC:  
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•  to pay for practical training places offered to initial VET students by enterprises and 
to support the Chamber of Commerce in its overview of the training. Funds are 
distributed on the basis of applications by enterprises providing practical training for 
VET school students, verified by a direct contract with a vocational school or 
mediated through the Chamber of Commerce; 
•  for the procurement of expensive equipment requested by a vocational or secondary 
vocational school; 
•  to contribute to the Leonardo da Vinci program and other national and international 
VET programs;  
•   to support the work of the National Institute for Vocational Education (NIVE). 
The vocational training contribution has increased considerably since the beginning of 
the 
1990s, growing from HUF 9.4 billion in 1991 to 15 billion in 1995, 30.6 billion in 1998, 
36 billion in 1999, 43.3 billion in 2000 and 47.6 billion in 2001. As part of this, the 
Vocational Training Fund increased from a share of about 20% of the total contribution 
up to 1996 to about 30% from 1997, while direct subsidies to schools increased most 
strongly from about 25% in 1991 to 40% in 1997 and more than 50% since 1998. The 
contribution to ‘corporate training’ decreased drastically and regularly from more than 
50% in 1991 to 39.3% in 1995, 29% in 1997, 18.6% in 1998, 16.1% in 1999 and 13.6% 
in 2000, while the threshold for this contribution to CVT increased from 0.2% to 0.5% in 
1999. 
I  n 2000 the vocational training contribution amounted to an estimated HUF 43.3 
billion (€173 million). The contribution from the Development and Training Fund to 
initial VET was estimated to be approximately €150 million or 0.3% of GDP, i.e. nearly 
one-third of the total estimated expenditure on initial VET. Therefore, only €23 million 
were available for CVT for their employees, 13.6% compared to a theoretical one-third. 
One reason for this could be the recent introduction of the reference to the National 
Vocational Qualification Register as a condition for accepting the funding of training  
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courses. Another explanation is probably that Hungarian companies are traditionally 
involved in initial education and training (it should be noticed that when the Vocational 
Training Fund was introduced before 1990, its purpose was to support schools, not CVT). 
Finally, the vast majority of Hungarian companies are small or very small (only 2% of 
them employ more than 300 people) and therefore they do not use this facility, as the 
money available could not cover their real training needs. 
Source: Sum, I.and Tóth, A., Financing vocational training outside the school, Hungarian Ministry of 
Education, 1999 in European Training Foundation 2006. 
However, employers felt that government exercised too strong control over the Fund and limited its 
effectiveness.  A survey on the degree of influence of the various stakeholders on the allocations from the 
VTF found (on a scale of 0-100) the government had the strongest influence (87) as compared to employers 




Annex 4.1  Training Funds in South Africa – A Dual Approach
15
In South Africa there is no training fund identified in the form of an institution in charge 
of the overall management of vocational training financing.  Instead, 23 sectoral training 
funds exist and one national skills fund. 
 
Overall Steering of the Financing System 
The Minister of Labor is responsible for policy on vocational training and is advised by 
the National Skills Authority (NSA) The NSA is comprised of public authorities, social 
partners, regional authorities and various public interest associations. Its main functions 
are to advise the Minister for Labor on skills development strategy and policy and on the 
regulation and allocation of resources. The NSA is in charge of relations with the SETAs 
(Sector Education and Training Authorities) in implementation of the national strategic 
plan from a sectoral point of view. Finally, NSA assesses the implementation of national 
strategic plans. The NSA plays an exclusive role of advisor. Public authorities control the 
entire decision-making process albeit with open dialogue with all social partners.  
Payroll Levy  
Financing of vocational training, excluding basic training, is based on a levy-grant 
scheme. This mechanism was established by a 1999 bill and constitutes a permanent 
system of resources for financing all training actions targeted by the skills development 
scheme. This mechanism, enacted into law in 1999, involves a compulsory payment by 
employers of one percent of payroll. Employers with an annual payroll below R500,000 
per year are exempt from the levy. Public-service employers in the national or provincial 
sphere of government, religious and charitable institutions, and national or provincial 
public entities whose expenditure is paid directly or indirectly from public funds voted by 
Parliament are also exempt. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based 
organizations (CBOs) and community-based cooperatives are also exempt from the levy. 
The National Skills Development Strategy 2005-2010 however, obliges national and 
                                                 
15 Based on Waltham and Gauron.  
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provincial government departments to devote one percent of their payroll budgets to 
training as of March 2010. The levy is paid monthly as part of  tax contributions to the 
South African Revenue Service. The annual amount of the levy amounts to R3.4 billion 
[update]. 
 
Distribution of the Levy between a National Fund and Sectoral Funds 
The payroll levy is distributed as follows: 20 percent to the National Skills Fund (NSF) 
and 80 percent to the 23 Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs). The SETAs 
allocate half of the levy proceeds to set objectives and 20 percent to discretionary 
objectives that comply with the sectoral and national priorities.  
Diagram 1- Allocation of the Payroll Levy 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Waltham, 2.1.3. 
National Skills Fund (NSF) 
The Skills Development Act of 1998 stipulates the following objectives for the NSF: 
“Funds in the NSF may be used only to fund: 1. Projects identified in the National Skills  
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Development Strategy (NSDS) as national priorities. 2. Other projects related to the 
achievement of the purposes of the Skills Development Act as the Director-General may 
determine.  One of the key  national priorities identified for the NSF is to reduce 
unemployment and underemployment through supporting social development initiatives. 
Another is to respond to the lack of skills in critical fields or sectors. Undergirding the 
activities of the NSF is equitable access to skills development among the disadvantaged 
black population, women and handicapped persons.  
The funds collected go through the employment administration channels and are 
distributed in relation to the objectives determined for training by a five-year National 
Skills Development Strategy (NSDS). The first strategy covered the 2001-2005 and the 
second 2005-2010/ One third of the fund’s resources goes through the channels of 
provincial social development plans, one third is allocated to the development of strategic 
skills and the rest could either finance training research projects, student grants or 
companies employing workers as part of their new investments. 
The “funding windows” for the second NSDS are as follows:
16
•  Social Development Initiatives including the Expanded Public Works Program 
(EPWP) 
 
•  Adult Basic Education and Training 
•  Critical Skills Support 
•  Provisioning Support 
•  Industry Support 
•  Informal Sector Support 
•  Constituency Capacity Building and Advocacy 
•  Special Projects 
•  Promotion of the NSDS 
•  Research 
•  Supplementary support for disability 
•  Promotion of excellence 
•  Discretionary and Innovation Projects 
                                                 
16 Source:  Department of Labor, “National Skills Fund,” n.d.  
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Sector Education and Training Authorities  (SETAS) 
Set up in 1998, the SETAs are sectoral organizations present within 23 sectoral branches 
(finance, banking, textile industry, chemistry, agriculture, etc.).  Each is run by a 
management board made up of employers' representatives and workers' representatives 
on a 50/50 basis. The board is responsible for defining the strategic approach of the 
sector, controlling its activities, informing its members of the activities implemented and 
making all the decisions in the interest of developing priority skills for the sector. The 
SETAs are required to draw up annual development plans for their sectors. 
SETAs receive 80 percent of the total levy. The grants allocated to them are distributed as 
follows: 
•  50 percent are grants to enterprises, “Workplace Skills Grants”, based on 
applications including annual Workplace Skills Plans (WSPs).  The WSPs are 
structured mainly on the implementation of learnerships or work-based education 
and training programs, as well as an assessment of accomplishments under 
previous annual plans.  The SETAs have no freedom of decision in this field and 
simply check the conformity of applications and justifications presented by the 
businesses. In addition, SETAs, as part of the responsibilities determined for them 
in the implementation of the National Skills Development Strategy, identify the 
critical skills of the sector, train specialists in sectoral training, integrate job 
seekers into new jobs, raise the level of skills among adults with little or no 
training.  The SETAs can access NSF funds for these different actions. 
•  10 percent of the grants are used to finance SETAs’ personnel and internal 
running. The performance of SETAs was assessed following completion of the 
first National Skills Development Strategy 2001-2005. Performance varied 
according to SETA and according to their management and technical expertise.  
[add detail]   
79 
 
Dual Role of the Funds 
Qualification Objectives 
Training courses carried out by the NSF or the SETAs aim at the national qualifications 
and or certification system operated by the "South African Qualifications Authority" 
(SAQA). It was thus planned that at least 70% of all workers participating in training 
courses financed by the funds would reach level 1 of the national qualification system by 
March 2005.  
Strategic Development Objectives 
Financing of both the NSF and the SETAs is in keeping with the  National Skills 
Development Strategy (NSDS). An initial strategy for 2001-2005 had set the objectives 
of training a minimum of 15% of workers and giving 75% of large businesses and 40% of 
medium-sized businesses access to the 0.5% rebate of the levy. A new 2005-2010 
strategy retains the same objectives but sets new ceilings: 80% of large businesses, 60% 
of medium-sized businesses and 40% of small businesses should be able to receive 
finance and 70% of the 450,000 job seekers in need of training should in fact be able to 
obtain work. It states at the same time that the training programs to be implemented 
should be based on an equity policy in the field of employment and for this it should aim 
to include 85% of black people, 54% of women and 4% of people with disabilities among 
its participants.  
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Annex 5.1  Cote d’Ivoire17: Labor Force Training Support Project
18
Component: Improvement of the Vocational Training Development Fund (Total cost 
$15.4 million, including contingencies). 
 
$17.0 million, Cr. No. 26370; Effective 6/22/1995 
Closing Date: Original: 2/28/1999; Actual:  June 30, 2001 
 
Background and Problems To Be Addressed: Since 1959 Cote d’Ivoire has financed 
skill development for the modern sector through a tax levy system.  However, several 
problems and inefficiencies occurred.  Resource allocation tended to shift toward formal 
technical training institutions.  Employers complained that the training increasingly was 
irrelevant to their needs.  Administrative costs were high.  Revenues from the levy were 
kept by the government and not transferred to the Fund during periods of financial 
constraint.  Above all, small firms and persons working in the informal sector had little 
access to the training. 
In 1991 the Government reformed the system and set up the “Fonds de Developpement 
de la Formation Professionnelle”, (FDFP), or the Vocational Training Development Fund 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Fund’.  It is financed by a tax levy (1.6% of payroll, of 
which 0.6% is directly managed by firms) that generates about $18 million per year.  The 
revenue from the levy is transferred directly from the Revenue Services, thereby giving 
the Fund financial autonomy and a stable source of income.  The Fund is managed 
relatively independently of government by a Board with equal representation of 
employers, employees and the government. 
                                                 
17  Acronyms used in this case are:  FDFP= Vocational Training Fund; MTR = mid-term review of 
implementation; SAR = staff appraisal report 
18 This case study is based on the Staff Appraisal Report No. 12850-IVC, “Labor Force Training Support 
Project,”  May 27, 1994, the Mid-Term Review dated February 26, 1998, “Cote d’Ivoire:  A Demand-
Driven Skills Development Scheme to Benefit the Poor,”  no date, the Project Status Report of 6/5/00 and 
information exchanges with Mr. Rachidi Radji ,  the Task Team Leader, and Jean Ette, et. al., “Impact 
economique de la Composante Formulation du PAFPA:  Rapport Final,” July 1999.  
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Objectives:  The project aims at “greater labor force productivity and mobility through 
technical and basic skills training, with special emphasis on the needs of small informal 
sector and women’s enterprises.”  (SAR, summary, p. i). 
Means:  The project finances a time-slice of the on-going program of the Vocational 
Training Development Fund (FDFP) and its expansion to include new client groups. The 
assistance is divided into two parts: Training, Retraining and Apprenticeship (79% of 
total costs $15.4 million, including contingencies) and Training Outreach Support (6% of 
total project costs including contingencies.   
Under the ‘Training’ sub-component, the project adds financing to the Fund to expand its 
support to neglected target groups.  These include (a) workers in small formal sector 
enterprises that have been slow in developing training for their workers; (b) micro-
enterprises in the informal sector; (c) women entrepreneurs; (d) displaced workers and (e) 
support for initial job insertion through apprenticeships.  The main target populations 
have become women entrepreneurs in the informal sector, professional organizations, 
NGOs and cooperatives and youth associations.  
The ‘Outreach’ sub-component includes assistance for consultants, operating costs and 
incremental Fund staff to expand its activities in informing the public, sponsors and 
beneficiaries about the objectives and operations of the Fund.  The aim is to help extend 
the Fund’s work outside it usual client group (formal sector enterprises) and geographic 
overage (Abidjan) 
Modus Operandi: The Training Fund (FDFP) had a long tradition of awarding contracts 
before the start of the training project.  Under the training project pre-qualification has 
been undertaken among potential training providers according to FDFP procedures.  
Prequalification involved visits by staff to applicants and assessment of their training 
capabilities.  Prequalification was granted to according to areas of training competence, 
i.e. a training provider may prove qualified in delivering training in livestock but not in 
other fields.  Prequalified training providers became a pool from which competitive bids 
could be drawn.  
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Training sub-projects are designed according to the following procedure:  As a result of 
FDFP’s outreach and sensitization, a sponsor (Mayors, NGO, company) would send a 
training proposal to the FDFP.   Depending on the nature of the sponsor, these proposals 
typically were no more than an idea, e.g. village entrepreneurs needed training in 
accounting and marketing.  Training advisers for the FDFP would then work with the 
sponsor along with representatives of the beneficiaries group when these are already 
organized to develop the idea into a design of a training program. Each subproject is 
assessed on “the value of its training content, its cost-effectiveness compared to 
established ‘norms’, its priority with respect to indicative gender and age criteria and the 
legitimacy of the sponsor and the credibility of the training institution.” (SAR, p.16)  An 
operations manual has been developed with these criteria and procedures for their 
application to ensure transparency.  Award of training contracts is being done through 
competition from pre-qualified training providers. The proposed training program is then 
sent to three to six prequalified training providers.  Several would submit bids to carry 
out the training program, and these bids would be evaluated competitively by FDFP staff.  
Contracts would be awarded to the best bid.  The process of generating training proposals 
started slowly because it depended on the ‘outreach’ function, or marketing of the 
availability of training funds. 
In terms of cost recovery, trainees initially made no direct payments for the training, but 
were expected to absorb the indirect costs (transportation, lodging, opportunity costs, 
etc.)  At the MTR cost recovery was increased.  Beneficiaries group  thereafter had to  
cover 10-15% of the costs in kind or cash. 
Supervision of training programs involved the following steps.  (1) “Reunion de 
lancement:” Before training commences a meeting is convened by the regional office of 
the Training Fund including the sponsor, the trainees representative and training provider.  
Agreement is reached on an action plan and timetable for delivery of the training. (2) 
Mid-term meeting.  A meeting of the same parties is convened  at about the mid-point of 
the training in the field where the training is taking place. The purpose is to review 
progress against the action plan and timetable, identify problems and work out solutions.  
(3) At the end of the training a meeting is organized by the designer of the training  
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program to assess the results.  In addition, the Fund has controllers who check randomly 
from regional offices to ensure that the intended training is actually taking place for the 
specified target groups.  Training advisers also can hire technical experts on a contract 
basis to make checks on quality. 
Implementation Problems 
 
The project involved training for the informal sector, something the FDFP had not done 
before.  Consequently the demand for such training had to be stimulated and promoted.  
This “marketing” of the training funds took time, especially outside Abidjan and caused 
delays at the start of implementation. 
The TF existed before the training project, but its focus was on the formal sector of the 
economy. Its prevailing procedures for processing sub-projects in the formal sector were 
inappropriate when applied to small sub-projects in the informal sector.  All training 
programs had to be approved by the Board of Directors and it only met infrequently. 
Eventually  –  to speed project processing --  the Board delegated to the   Executive 
Secretary approvals of 10 million CFA, subsequently raised to 15 million CFA 
(equivalent at present to $25,000).  No changes were needed in the composition of the 
Board, which had equal representations by unions, government and employers, but , the 
secretariat of the TF had to be reorganized.  It had been set up to service the modern 
sector and tax paying enterprises.  No explicit unit existed for small and medium 
enterprises (“non-cotizan”) that were not tax paying.   
The quality control scheme had to be improved as implementation progressed.  The 
Training Fund was not able to increase training delivery and simultaneously ensure 
quality.  Training packages were standardized under the project, and if necessary project 
proposals were subjected to review by outside experts.  These measures, plus 
prequalification, helped ensure reasonable ‘quality at entry’ for the training programs.   
No rigorous checks were established on the quality of training outputs, i.e. competencies 
acquired. However, the results of the beneficiary assessment have, however, showed that 
the trainees felt that the training did contribute to improve their competencies (see below)    
84 
During the MTR a detailed action plan was prepared to increase the quality, impact and 
efficiency of project results.  These included (a) increasing the impact on beneficiaries 
through better risk analysis (i.e. taking into account the need for complementary inputs) 
and reinforcement of monitoring and evaluation; (b) improving project procedures by 
increasing delegation of sub-project processing, testing of alternative approaches in 
designing subprojects and better selection of training providers through better 
information dissemination; (c) sustaining demand for training through information 
campaigns, and (d) further efforts to control and lower training costs and increase cost-
sharing with beneficiaries/sponsors.  
Outcomes and Impact 
The mid-term review focused only on beneficiary assessment as a proxy for evaluation, 
i.e. whether participants thought the training was good or bad.  After the MTR a thorough 
impact evaluation was launched, including control groups.  
The Mid-term Review in 1998 “underscored that the project’s training activities had 
responded to the needs of the beneficiaries.  This had resulted, in general, in an 
improvement in the level of their skills.  Although the evaluation work done in the course 
of the MTR did not allow for a sound assessment of the project’s economic impact, there 
was evidence in the case of some training that the trainee’s conditions had improved or 
would soon improve.  A total of 137 training subprojects was processed and benefited 
about 21,000 people, of whom 48% are women.  Training in the fields of agriculture and 
livestock remains the most demanded (37%) and the majority of the beneficiaries 
corresponded to priority target groups (informal sector and poor people.)  (MTR, Form 
590, p.4) According to the beneficiary assessment findings, a great majority of the 
beneficiaries (92%) expressed their satisfaction regarding the quality of the training 
received and its positive impact on their technical competence.  However, only 58% felt 
that their ultimate objective and expectation, that is to increase revenue and find a job, 
had been achieved.”  (MRT, covering note, p.2) It was also noted that “the lack and or the 
insufficient availability of other necessary resources and inputs (e.g., water, credit) 
tended to limit the project’s impact on the beneficiaries.   
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The volume of training provided under the project has increased substantially, from 
21,000 persons training in 1998 to 71,000 by the end of 2000, including the execution of 
700 training subprojects.(PSR, 1/4/01)  
A major impact evaluation
19
Another economic evaluation published in 2005
 was conducted in 1999.  It found overall that the training 
had a positive impact on incomes of the participants in some fields.   It also found that the 
impact varied by field of training and location. Training of craftsmen – those already in 
occupations such as electronics repair and tailoring – has achieved the greatest impact.  
Electronic repair participants saw their incomes increase from an average of 74.2 units to 
100.0 units, whereas the incomes of non-beneficiaries actually decreased over the same 
period from 65.3 units to 57.6 units.  Tailors also increased their incomes, from 126.4 
units to 192.3 units.  The outcomes were less positive in training for rural occupations 
such as agriculture and livestock. It became clear that training must be complemented by 
inputs such as water, microfinance and marketing.  The impact evaluation concluded that 
training should be complemented by assistance for materials or financing of the 
enterprises, that technical training should be complemented by training in management of 
micro enterprises, and that successful participants should obtain certification (“attestation 
de stage”) for the training they have received to help them in the market place. 
20
Other project achievements pertain to geographical distribution of training and training 
costs.  Before the MTR the bulk of the training, about 40% of the total, took place in 
 also showed positive results in some 
sectors and for some groups.  The study found positive economic impacts for some, but 
not all groups, as a result of training received.  Positive results were recorded for women, 
the agricultural and electronics sectors, firms employing 1-3 individuals and firms with 
10 or more employees.  In part, the “positive” economic effect was avoidance of loss of 
income suffered by other workers during a period of economic downturn. 
                                                 
19 Jean Ette, et. al., “Impact Economique de la Composante Formation du PAFPA:  Rapport Final”, Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et Appliquees sur les Politiques Social et les Systemes de Securite Social 
(CEPRASS), July 1999 
20 Verner, Dorte and Mette Verner. 2005. “Economic Impacts of Professional Training in the Informal 
Sector: The Case of the Labor Force Training Program in Cote d’Ivoire.” Policy Research Working Paper 
3668, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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Abidjan.  In 1998 and 1999 this proportion was reduced to 20% and about 15%, showing 
a better regional distribution of beneficiaries. 
The unit costs of training also declined.  Before the MTR, the average cost per trainee 
was $383 and this steadily declined to $300 in 1998 and $260 in 1999.  Beneficiary or 
sponsor contributions also increased from 5% to 10% over the same period.  Two factors 
account for the substantial reduction in costs:  (1) standardization of training packages; 
this clarified the extent of training services required, and (2) competition among training 
providers. However, no attempts were made under the project to compare costs with 
benefits or effects.  The manager’s note stated that “the costs and benefits of the training 
… must be better analyzed in order to refine financing policies.” (PSR, 6/5/00, p.3) 
It was feared at the outset that, under competition, publicly subsidized training 
institutions would have a clear price advantage over private providers in the bidding 
process.  However, as it turned out, public providers won only about one fourth of the 
training contracts.  The competitive process has infused a new style of management 
within training institutions, both public and private.  The focus now is on responding to a 
market.  Managers of training institutions are learning to fight for funds, rather than sit 
back passively and wait for them.  They have become organized to sell themselves.  
Managers of technical lycees are talking like entrepreneurs.  Also, the project has helped 
introduce real competition among private training providers on the basis of reduced price.  
The private sector is also diversifying its service offerings.  Some training providers have 
established small regional units outside Abidjan.  This creates a dynamic to improve 
quality.   
One indirect effect of the project is an increased understanding by Board members of the 
needs of the informal sector.  They are now willing to put tax money into the informal 
sector – as shown in the allocation of 2 billion CFA in 1999 and 2.5 billion in 2000 (or 
18-20% of total allocations from the Fund.)  This cross subsidization (i.e. using funds 
raised from enterprises in the formal sector to finance training in the informal sector) 
augurs well for sustainability of training for the informal sector within the Fund.    
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The Training Fund had no tradition to use competition among training providers in the 
award of contracts.  Collusion had been common between training providers and 
beneficiaries.  Now, the Fund management is convinced about the benefits of competition 
and increasingly applies competition in the award of its routine training funds. 
Annex 5.2  Donor-financed Training Funds in West Africa21
Governments in three West African countries collaborated with international financial 
institutions to develop three training funds in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  These 
include the Support Fund for Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA) of 
Burkina Faso (starting in 2003), the promotion of employment and vocational training, 
the FAFPA of Mali (1997), and the Fund for the Development of Vocational Training 
and Apprenticeship (FODEFCA) of Benin (1999). 
 
The Malian and Benin Funds received support from the World Bank and French 
Cooperation from 1996-2001 and 2000-2004, respectively.  The Burkinabe fund was 
supported  by technical assistance from Austria, Switzerland, GTZ and French 
Cooperation. 
In terms of a development approach, the three funds differentiate themselves through four 
characteristics: i) all three of them are funded by the budget from the State who receives 
the tax paid by the modern sector and partially transforms it into an annual contribution, 
ii) they establish a de facto solidarity between the formal and informal sectors, iii) they 
intervene directly or indirectly in the implementation of dual-type apprenticeship actions 
or mechanisms with certain players from the  informal sector and iv) they act under the 
joint or separate influence of international technical and financial assistance providers 
and national authorities. 
Each fund is a public autonomous organization with mixed management.  The 
Management Committee for the Benin FODEFCA is comprised of 12 officials, equally 
divided among government, employers and union representatives. The Burkina 
                                                 
21 Source:  Walther and Gauron (2006).  
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Management Committee has nine members, including four state officials and five 
representing employers. The Malian Management Board is comprised of 12 members, 
including seven representing “users”, one from FAFPA and four public officials. 
In theory, financing of FAFPAs and of the FODEFCA comes from the reallocation of 
part of the vocational training tax received by the State up to a certain percentage of 
payroll and the contribution of training beneficiaries (between 10% and 25% of the cost 
of training). In practice, the governments substituted the repayment of part of the tax due 
to the funds, with a State subsidy of a lower amount than that which should have been 
paid. Furthermore, financial support from the World Bank called for a progressive 
increase in the use of national resources from 314 million CFA Francs in 2000, to 963 
million CFA Francs in Mali and from 162 million CFA Francs  to 457 CFA Francs in 
Benin.  
During the 2000 – 2005 available resources were not used fully: in Benin for example, 
the usage rate was less than 85% for the entire period and it was lower than 80% in 2005. 
Mali suffered from delays on the Public Treasury's side in reallocating the income 
collected to the funds. In addition to the problems of long waiting periods linked to 
application procedures and invitations to tender on the one hand, and the difficulties 
sometimes encountered by beneficiaries (who may have taken out credit) in paying their 
contribution on the other hand, the usage rate also reflects the limits of training 
availability. The end of World Bank support meant a significant reduction in resources 
for both the FAFPA (Mali) and the FODEFCA.   
Functions. The three Funds were intended to be one-stop offices with transparent 
procedures intended to promote a vocational training market.  Their mission was to (a) 
receive and manage resources intended for continuing training and apprenticeship, (b) 
finance vocational training for the currently employed workforce, (c) finance studies 
aimed at building a coherent training policy, (d) promote continuing training and 
apprenticeship through information, (e) help employers in the formal and informal sectors 
to define their training needs and prepare training plans and programs, and (f) help 
support and upgrade training providers.  
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In response to technical education that was considered to be too academic and whose 
contents were disconnected from economic realities, the creation of the funds sought a 
double break from the previous situation: (i) moving from a supply-based approach 
dominated by technical education to a demand-based approach driven by employers’ 
needs, and (ii) promoting a vocational training market through the implementation of 
transparent procedures for invitations to tender and if need be, by prohibiting public 
establishments from responding under the pretext that their State finance distorts 
competition. 
Training Providers 
In the Sub-Saharan African countries that were supported and financed by the World 
Bank, the selection and contracting procedures implemented aimed to ensure the 
transparency of the choice of successful tenders and to encourage the creation of a market 
of continuing education through a competitive offer. They were based on three 
provisions: 
•  An application for finance presented by a legally declared promoter (craftsmen’s 
or company association) and backed by an expert or a training counselor who 
helps to formulate the request. 
•  The fund’s organization of an invitation to tender to which at least three service 
providers must respond. In the case where there are less than three responses, the 
market cannot be attributed and the invitation to tender must be re-launched.  
•  After three failures, a single tendering procedure can be implemented. 
•  An accreditation procedure for training bodies. 
Beneficiaries 
The projects had multiple target groups.  Bank projects focused on the informal sector, 
young early school leavers and disadvantaged groups.  However, the technical assistance 
provided by Swisscontact in Benin and Mali and Swisscontact and Austrian Cooperation 
in Burkina Faso focuses mainly on training for apprentices and craftspeople in the form 
of dual-type apprenticeships (practical and theory.  As a result, the delivery of training in 
terms of participants favored the informal sector (at lower unit costs), but the amounts 
spent were mainly on modern sector training.  For example, in Mali the cost for in- 
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service training courses averaged about 130,000 CFA Francs, and for apprenticeship 
training from 340,000 CFA Francs to 554,000 CFA Francs. In 2004 2230 people were 
trained for the informal sector compared with only 520 for the modern sector.  In Benin a 
total of 22,350 people had been trained by 2005, slightly more than the revised objective.  
Most people were trained for the informal sector, about 17,400 people compared with 
2,900 for the modern sector and 1,500 in apprenticeship. The target for female 
beneficiaries, 60 percent of the total, was seriously underachieved – the percentage of 
female beneficiaries was just under 30 percent.  
Implementation 
The Funds played a central role in promoting vocational training by pooling funds and 
making demands effective (explicit.)  However, the results have only partly met the 
original expectations: The training market has not really developed, except in some 
tertiary professions that need very little in the way of equipment and permanent 
instructors. The demand for training, which is formulated with great difficulty, is 
sometimes held up by application procedures defined by the World Bank in exchange for 
its support. 
Insecurity of levy proceeds. The existence of a “vocational training” levy created without 
any relation to it and with a high rate, is the first cause of difficulty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Its collection is in fact looked after by the tax offices to finance the State budget. 
Allocating all or part of the levy to the existing fund would mean depriving it of part of 
the expected resources. Up until now the Ministers of Finance have been against 
recognizing that part of the tax collected (equivalent to the tax on wages provided for by 
the texts creating the funds) could be automatically paid to them. In all countries, the 
Minister of Finance preferred to grant a subsidy that is supposed to represent the amount 
of the tax due. It is the Minister who eventually decides the amounts of resources 
allocated to the funds. In reality, the contribution is always less than this amount: in Mali, 
the payment is the equivalent of 0.5% of payroll and is completed by an additional 
subsidy. In Benin and in Burkina Faso, the contribution is totally disconnected from any 
relationship with a percentage of payroll.  
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Cross-subsidization. The second difficulty in Sub-Saharan Africa is linked to the fact 
that, while the modern sector is the only contributor, the handicraft sector is the main 
beneficiary of the resources collected.  However, this was not a major issue, as 
government and employers voiced “solidarity” with transfers to the informal sector. In 
Mali and Burkina Faso, certain players even defended this solidarity on the grounds that 
the formal sector sub-contracts many of its activities to the informal sector and in this 
way makes a substantial profit out of it. However, the issue is expected to become more 
important in future as the financial requirements increase for expanding the dual 
apprenticeship system for the modern sector. 
Representation by the social partners.   Governance- The study observed that the tripartite 
nature of governance varied considerably among the three Funds.  In general, governance 
was dominated by the public sector and was weakened by the nature of the stakeholder 
representation. In only Benin was representation equal among government, employers 
and unions.  In Mali employers were represented by a civil servant and unions were 
absent.  
Lack of technical expertise in design of training proposals.  This hinders the transition 
from “off the shelf” training courses to those adapted to employer and client needs. 
Creation of a training market. In Mali and Benin, the invitation to tender procedure 
implemented on the basis of World Bank recommendations, in fact turned out to be little 
adapted to the realities of these countries. The obligation of carrying out three invitations 
to tender before being able to proceed to single tendering led to excessively long response 
times. Added to these delays were those linked to the inadequacies of a large number of 
offers that did not comply with the rules laid out and to the gathering of necessary funds 
to cover the beneficiaries’ contributions. In some cases, these delays were more than two 
years. It was undoubtedly illusory to think that the existence of invitations to tender alone 
would suffice to create a training market. The potential demand in Sub-Saharan African 
countries is largely insufficient to allow the creation of a sufficient number of bodies and 
to allow for at least three responses in all cases. Furthermore, the exclusion of public 
establishments (as requested initially by the World Bank) under the pretext that they 
distort competition, made supply even rarer, especially in the branches that require a  
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minimum amount of equipment. Where the World Bank intervened (Benin, Mali) it had 
to reconsider its ostracism concerning public establishments. 
Demand-driven training. Reality turned out to be obstinate regarding this approach. 
Demand turned out to be too weak and insufficiently solvent to be predictable and to 
allow training bodies to invest in instructors and equipment to create a training market. 
The market stimulated a concentration of rare investments in the training segments that 
do not need specific equipment or permanent instructors; mainly management and 
computing. Elsewhere, the failure of invitations to tender demonstrated fully the 
impossibility of seeing a market emerge just from procedures intended to create it, and 
even more so the illusory nature of excluding public establishments, which had to be 
reintroduced to the stakes. It would however be wrong to attribute this failure uniquely to 
the complexity of procedures implemented by the World Bank. As long as there is no 
solvent demand of sufficient volume to justify the presence of several operators and offer 
prospects justifying risk-taking, and therefore investment, there will not be a market. It 
cannot be decreed by imposing procedures, albeit simplified ones. It will only grow as 
solvent training demand grows. We are not there yet. 
Recommendations
22
1.   In view of many competing interests, it is essential to clarify objectives. 
 
2.  Ensure financial autonomy –  both in receipt of funds and their disposition.  The 
Funds at present do not have real control over their resources. Without control of 
resources by the funds’ managers, it would be impossible to define a veritable 
training strategy in their own fields. In Sub-Saharan Africa where “vocational 
training” quasi-taxes existed before the funds were created, itis desirable that the 
fraction which is allocated to them be clearly identified and directly collected, 
forexample simultaneously to social welfare contributions. 
3.  Adapt procedures to the capacities of micro and small businesses. It is absolutely 
necessary that the funds envisage (with or without their support) the development of 
allocation procedures that are in relation with the real contribution capacities of 
                                                 
22 Source:  Walther and Gauron (2006).  
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players who need financial support the most in order to move away from the survival 
mentality and enter the realm of development. 
4.   Need to stimulate training demand. It was logical that the funds begin with the most 
simple: financing training by addressing training bodies already carrying out training. 
The actual move from a supply-based to a demand-based approach implies leaving 
this framework and the financing of pre-formatted training courses in favor of 
building appropriate responses for applicants’ needs. Up until now, this approach 
came up against two obstacles: the scarcity of expertise in training engineering and 
the low demand for training (which makes the drafting of specific responses costly).  
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Annex 5.3  Papua New Guinea:  Employment-Oriented Skills Development 
Project 
(ADB Project, October 1999) 
Problems To Be Addressed 
•  The vast majority of the population is in the informal sector and mostly engaged in 
subsistence agriculture (estimated at 75-90 percent of the labor force.).  The urban 
informal sector is estimated to account for less than 10 percent of all employment. 
•  Low availability of vocational training.  Current output of 56,000 school leavers vs. 
annual intake capacity of 7,000 into VTCs.  
•  Non-government training providers account for a major proportion of current 
enrollments, but non-formal training opportunities are limited. 
•  Outcomes of formal vocational training (after 2-3 years) has little relevance to future 
employment. (22) 
•  Outcomes of VTCs in terms of acquisition of knowledge and skills are of 
questionable quality.   
•  Inadequate resourcing of vocational education in terms of facilities, equipment and 
maintenance, as well as upgrading management and instructor skills.  Only 0.7 
percent of central government expenditure in education was allocated to VET, which 
confirms the status of VET as the ‘poor relation’ of the education sector. (4) 
•  Teacher guides and student texts and workbooks either are not yet or are poorly 
developed. Both curricula and entry requirements lack flexibility, making it difficult 
for VTCs to adapt to meet specific local needs for skills. 
•  Lack of recognition of many vocational center outcomes. 
•  Inadequate record keeping on graduates and absence of basic management 
information on inputs and outputs (e.g. costs per student).  
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Goal: Realize the income earning potential of un- and under-employed population in 
rural and urban areas. 
Purpose Increase the availability of quality non-formal competency based skills training 
and the possibilities for application of the detailed skills in wage and self-employment. 
Components 
A.  Legal and policy framework: Put in place a legal and policy framework conducive to 
skills development, provision and application for wage and self-employment. 
1. Develop and implement national and provincial skills development plans and 
overall non-formal education policies –  addressing such topics as 
national/provincial coordination, role of NGOs, liaising with private sector, 
financing and cost recovery. 
2. Establishment of a coordinating mechanism for non-formal skills training 
involving all stakeholders 
3. Establishment of linkages with national skills standards 
4. Reduction in regulatory impediments to informal sector development 
B.  Building the institutional capacity of training providers. 
1. Establishment of a Skills Training Resources Unit 
•  Do research on and develop CBT for 14 prioritized areas in the informal 
sector; and collect curriculum materials for short term, modular CBT 
•  Advise training providers on training methods, delivery modalities, testing 
and certification and sources for training equipment. 
2. Improvement of the human resource competencies of training providers 
•  Management training for public and private training officials, training of 
training programs in pedagogy/andragogogy and entrepreneurship – with 10-
20% cost recovery.   
•  Training in preparing training proposals and conducting training needs 
analysis.  
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C.  Establishment of a sustainable financing mechanism – the Skills Development Trust 
Fund.  The Fund will finance contracts for training providers to offer short-term 
vocational and entrepreneurial training.  The Fund will be registered to ensure 
institutional and political autonomy.  It consists of a (1) a national board of trustees to 
approve guidelines and policies, (2) a national secretariat to do the day to day non-
financial administration, (3) provincial secretariats to promote and assess training 
proposals and monitor and evaluate results, (4) a provincial committee to review 
training proposals and award training contracts.   
Financing 
•  Cost recovery of 20% (by training provider) and 10% by trainees. 
•  To ensure financial sustainability of the Fund, the Fund will spend only a maximum 
of 10 percent of the capital base each year plus annual returns on the endowment.  
The capital base will be replenished (14). 
•  The Fund will accept contributions from the private sector, aid agencies and 
government, in addition to ADB funds. 
•  Just under half the net project proceeds (US$15m/32.5m) is for financing training 
through the Fund. 
Special Features 
•  Comprehensive approach, involving policy development, institutional capacity 
building and training delivery. 
•  Extensive analysis and attention to non-government training provision.  Training will 
be provided not only by government VTCs, but also by church organizations, NGOs 
and private training providers. 
•  Cost recover and attention to financial sustainability 
•  Use of a trust fund to allocate financing for informal-sector training programs 
•  Focus on short term training only 
•  Selection and award of training contracts will be on a competitive basis.  
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•  Performance requirements: Satisfactory results are a precondition for subsequent 
training contracts: winning training providers required to provide evidence of post-
training employment 
•  Training needs analysis included in proposal preparation 
•  Attention to post training support included in training contracts 
Assessment:  From the project documentation, this appears to be a highly innovative, 
appropriately targeted and well designed project that makes use of all training capacity 
(government and non-government.)
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A.  Strengths 
 
1.  Comprehensive approach 
2.  Attention to regulatory and other impediments to informal sector development 
3.  Project focuses on main employment – self-employment in the informal sector. 
4.  Use of quasi-market mechanisms to improve cost-effectiveness of training,   
e.g. competition, performance 
5.  Attention to post-training requirements for success 
6.  Use of flexible fund mechanism, including analysis of essential requirements for 
success, that should permit flexible allocation of funds to priority projects among 
multiple target groups 
7.  Considerable attention to cost-recovery and financial sustainability 
B.  Possible Weaknesses 
1.  No apparent analysis of why coordination mechanisms have failed in the past, and 
how current proposals address the reasons for those failures. 
2.  Entrepreneurship development ought to be taught by entrepreneurs, not 
bureaucrats, civil servants or pedagogy specialists.  No evidence that is the case 
here. 
                                                 
23 Source:   ADB (2004).  
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3.  Complex structure for SDTF, and now clear what professional/administrative 
support will be required for the national and provincial secretariats/committees, 
and how this capacity will be developed or provided.  For example, how will 
evaluation of results be done on multiple (400+) training contracts, and be fed into 
improvement of new training contracts? 
4.  A project of this kind requires substantial investment in rigorous and systematic 
evaluation of results of the training for informal sector.  Is enough support being 
provided for this purpose? 
5.  Training for the informal sector can make an impact on poverty in areas where 
income generation is possible, but will do little or nothing to prepare the country for 
skills-based growth.  What is being done to reform the rigid skills training system for 
wage employment, e.g. to reform the VTIs? 
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Annex 5.4  Cambodia National Training Fund 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported the establishment of a National Training 
Fund under its Basic Skills Project (completed in 2003.)
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National Training Fund 
 
Objectives.  The National Training Fund (NTF) was envisaged as a medium and long-
term mechanism for the financing of training from both Government and non-
Government funds. Initially, the NTF served as a means for providing Project-financed 
support for demand-oriented training, such as training programs relevant to employment 
needs and in accordance with the training policy and strategy of the National Training 
Board (NTB). In the longer term, the NTF was expected to evolve into the main 
mechanism for funding of employment-related training, including enterprise-based 
training. It aimed at becoming an instrument for providing incentives to training 
institutions, enterprises, and the private sector to upgrade and extend their provision of 
training. 
The NTF was established in December 1997. All of 1998 was spent identifying and 
designing the programs, developing systems and procedures, and training of staff. The 
NTB eventually developed and approved three financing facilities: 
(i)  The  Training Grant Fund (TGF), a grant facility for training providers 
contracted to do training for certain group of trainees in certain skill areas; 
(ii) The Innovative Skills Investment Assistance Fund (ISIAF), a loan facility for 
private training providers offering innovative training to their own target clientele 
for a fee;  
(iii)The Self-employment Generation Fund (SEGF), a micro-credit loan facility for 
small entrepreneurs in both urban and rural areas. 
                                                 
24 Sources:  ADB.  Project Documents: 
• August 1995.  RRP: Cambodia Basic Skills Project.  RRP:CAM 27411. 
• Project Completion Report: 2003.  Basic Skills Project (Cambodia) (Loan 1368-CAM[SF]), N.181-
03, 4 August. 
• 9 September 2005.  Project Performance Audit Report: Basic Skills Project (Cambodia).  Operations 
Evaluation Department.  IN.253-05.  
100 
Training Fund Accomplishments 
Training Grant Fund.  Altogether, for the 8 phases, the TGF trained 13,100 
beneficiaries from 24 provinces/cities in 53 skill areas at a cost of $1.9 million, or an 
average of $147 per trainee. The TGF beneficiaries comprised the poorest people 
(38.1%), school leavers (25.2%), orphans (15.1%), widows (9.9%), crippled demobilized 
soldiers (6.3%), and handicapped (5.5%). About 50.3% of the beneficiaries were women. 
Based on a tracer study on training outcomes, the average employment rate among 
graduates was 66%. The employment rate among women was 75 percent, significantly 
higher than that of men, which averaged only 58%. Categorized by type of beneficiaries, 
the employment rate ranged from  a low of 54.7% among school leavers to full 
employment among demobilized soldiers. Rough estimate of the provincial training 
centers indicated that among those who found employment, only about 20% were wage-
employed while about 80% were self-employed. The average income of those who found 
employment ranged from $32-$73 per month. When benchmarked against the $25 per 
month average salary of public servants, the impact of TGF on the income of 
beneficiaries was significant. The TGF had no cost recovery. Training fees could not be 
charged because the beneficiaries were very poor and even had to be provided assistance 
in transportation and food during the training period. But, in terms of employment 
generation, the TGF was efficient, requiring only an average investment of $222 per 
employed beneficiary (PCR, Appendix III).   
According to the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, one of the main 
achievements of the NTF was that it made grants to providers based on unit costs  , 
moving towards an output or performance base.  The MOF had trouble initially accepting 
this, but eventually did. 
Innovative Skills Investment Assistance Fund (ISIAF). The ISIAF disbursed $300,000 
to five training providers in 1999 and 2000. The ISIAF financed about 11,600 trainees.  
No tracer study was conducted on outcome of the training. The ISIAF was discontinued, 
and its fund allocation transferred to the SEGF, because one borrower defaulted. The 
money was eventually recovered from the guarantor (Ibid.)  
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Self-employment Generation Fund (SEGF).  The Self-employment Generation Fund 
(SEGF) was a micro-credit program with approach and features similar to that of the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. Beneficiaries were selected from poor families in a 
community, and were grouped into three to five members. Each member was required to 
have an existing or a proposed business to engage in. One requirement for eligibility to 
borrow from SEGF was that at least one member of the group must have graduated from 
TGF training. Each group had a leader, a collector, and a treasurer. All members were 
solitarily liable for the loans of other group members. Loan amounts generally ranged 
from $200–$3,000.  By December 2002 the SEGF, through the provincial training 
centers, had disbursed $1.4 million (including re-lending) to 5,650 members in 1,750 
groups in 15 provinces; 65% were women. The SEGF beneficiaries engaged in a wide 
variety of micro-enterprises such as algae and seaweed growing, bamboo basket making, 
animal raising, food processing, hairdressing, motorbike repair, onion growing, television 
and radio service and repair, silk weaving, masonry, stone carving, worm raising. 
Selection of eligible businesses was preceded by a training and employment needs 
assessment (TENA) conducted by the provincial training centers, and by rudimentary 
feasibility studies. The high collection rates (around 92 percent) indicated that the SEGF 
businesses were doing well. The average income from such businesses ranged from $400 
to $900 per annum, a significant amount, especially in the countryside (Ibid. and PPAR). 
PCR conclusion and recommendations on the NTF: The experience of the NTF 
programs, the TGF and SEGF, was encouraging. Their impacts on the poor were direct, 
concrete, and substantial, and with relatively small investments. The TGF proved to be an 
efficient way to empower the poor by providing employable skills, either for wage or 
self-employment. The SEGF provided concrete opportunities for TGF graduates to apply 
acquired skills for self-employment. The systems, processes, and structures that the two 
programs put in place could be used for future fund operations. There was a need to 
upscale the operations of both programs to reach out to more target beneficiaries. This 
would require additional investments. 
Recommendations of  the PCR and PPAR:  (1) The TGF had no cost recovery 
mechanism, so it could be sustained only if there is a stable source of income to support  
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the training contract grants. For this kind of operation, a Trust Fund (the Fund) would be 
most appropriate. The Fund's principal should be large enough to generate sufficient 
earnings to support the desired amount of training every year. Therefore, consideration 
should be given to establishing a trust fund for the TGF with a principal amount of $15-
$20 million.  (2)  Conduct TENA regularly.  (3) Conduct tracer study on training 
outcomes. (4) Provide additional seed capital for the SEGF. 
Sustainability of the Training Fund 
The National Training Fund continued to operate using government funds (program 
budget) after closure of the Basic Skills Training Project.  The procedures for competitive 
award of contracts, and use of unit costs for pricing the training are still in use.  Thus, the 
institutional development gains from the project appear to be sustained.   
There are several limitations however.  The use of low unit costs in the competition for 
contracts effectively excludes private training providers.  Only government institutions 
and NGOs that have already sunk costs in teacher salaries can afford to compete.  Some 
adjustments need to be made to provide incentives for private providers to compete.   
Reportedly red tape makes it difficult to spend fully the government program budget 
allocated to the NTF. As a result some of the intended programs could not be financed.  
Whether this is a problem with start up of a new budgeting system, or reflects a deeper 
structural impediment, needs to be investigated and the way cleared for full use of NTF 
government funds. 
Clearly there is a need for mobilizing non-government resources for TVET.  A proposal 
has been put to the National Training Board on for establishing a one percent levy on 
payrolls for the purpose of both enterprise training and a general training fund. However, 
the proposal was not accepted because of objections by private sector representatives on 
the Board.  One employer association indicated that businesses would accept the levy 
provided it were administered for the benefit of enterprises and in a transparent manner.   
Source:  Richard Johanson. 2008. “TVET in Cambodia: An Initial Sub-sector Assessment,” draft, 
November, Asian Development Bank. 
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